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INTRODUCTION
The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing the 
EU’s security policy, NATO’s transformation, the reorientation of US security 
policy and the problems experienced by European defence industries – all to-
gether have in recent years created an increased interest in political, military 
and military-technological co-operation in Europe. It has manifested itself in 
concepts of closer co-operation within NATO and the EU (smart defence and 
pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral initiatives outside the structures 
of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic Defence Co-operation or the Franco-
British co-operation) and debates about the prerequisites, principles and objec-
tives of bilateral, multilateral and regional security and defence co-operation. 
The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence co-
operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea and the 
Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the 
Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland’s partners in the Visegrad 
Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as Romania and 
Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those states are Po-
land’s natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. It may com-
plement ‘the Western‘ direction of Poland’s security and defence policy, i.e. re-
lations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. Its goal is not 
to replace the existing security structures but rather to strengthen military 
capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU. 
Due to its geographic location and membership in NATO and the EU, Poland 
can develop closer co-operation with the countries of the Nordic-Baltic region. 
It also occupies a strong position in the Visegrad Group and can, furthermore, 
develop political and military co-operation with Romania and Bulgaria, given 
the similarities between its own perceptions of the role of NATO and relations 
with the US, and the views of Bucharest and Sofia on this subject. 
Part I of this report presents the conclusions of the analysis of the potential 
for political, military and technological co-operation in the area in question. 
Part II contains a detailed analysis of the political setting (defence policies), the 
military (the armed forces) and the economic conditions (the defence indus-
tries). Part II presents the experiences and formats of military co-operation to 
date, the circumstances in which it has taken place, its principles and objec-
tives, and the approaches of individual states to developing closer security and 
defence co-operation.
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PART I 
 
THE PREREQuISITES, OBJECTIVES AND 
PROSPECTS OF MILITARY CO-OPERATION 
AMONG SELECTED STATES IN THE AREA 
BETWEEN THE BALTIC SEA AND THE BLACK SEA
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1. BACKGROUND
The bilateral and multilateral military co-operation of the countries between the 
Baltic Sea and the Black Sea is not a new phenomenon – it dates back to the 1990s. 
The geographic proximity and the existing formats of institutional co-operation 
have provided a basis for co-operation on security and defence. This is how the 
Nordic Defence Co-operation first started, which later, in 2009, became organi-
sationally consolidated in the single structure of NORDEFCO and has functioned 
alongside the co-operation of its member states within NATO or the EU. The Baltic 
states have co-operated politically and militarily within NATO, albeit with less suc-
cess. In recent years, the Nordic and Baltic states have also been developing closer 
political and economic co-operation within the “Nordic-Baltic 8” group (NB8), and 
they are currently cautiously embarking on an extension of this co-operation into 
the military sphere. Shared foreign and security policy interests have provided 
a foundation for closer co-operation among the Visegrad Group members (V4) 
within NATO. In the case of Romania and Bulgaria, the most visible co-operation 
that has been that entered into is with the countries of the Western Balkans and 
the Black Sea region. It has been however hindered by the heterogeneity and the 
divergent interests of individual countries in the Black Sea region, as well as finan-
cial constraints and the slow pace of overcoming historical resentments with the 
countries of the Western Balkans. Romania, which has the largest potential and 
the biggest ambitions, has also been striving to develop closer co-operation with 
Central Europe, and with Poland in particular.
The new factor in regional co-operation today is its context. It is defined, first 
of all, by adverse changes in the security environment. Those changes have 
prompted countries with similar perceptions of the security challenges and 
threats, and which have similar regional and/or global interests, to become more 
interested in political and military co-operation. Financial issues are another 
new element in the context, i.e. the budgetary situation of the countries in 
question, where defence spending has been decreasing or has remained stable, or 
even where defence expenditures have been rising slightly. The defence budgets 
do not match the tasks assigned to the armed forces and are insufficient to cover 
the rising costs of purchases and the maintenance of armament and military 
equipment. Nor do they cover the costs of ever more demanding foreign opera-
tions, which have also been rising. Finally, the question of maintaining domestic 
defence industries has also been a factor in developing military co-operation. 
(1) Changes in the security environment. The development of political and 
military co-operation takes place in a context defined by transformations 
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within NATO and the (non-)evolution of the European Union’s security policy, 
the reorientation of US security policy and Russia’s increasingly unpredictable 
policy. However, those factors have been influencing the countries in ques-
tion to varying degrees and have borne a different impact on their attitudes 
towards closer co-operation in their respective regions. All of the NATO mem-
ber states analysed here regard NATO and relations with the United States as 
the most important guarantors of their national security, the security of their 
neighbourhood and the entire Euro-Atlantic area. Sweden and Finland are also 
aware of the importance of NATO and the United States’ presence in Europe for 
European security. However, all states also believe NATO to be in transition, 
and the direction of its further transformation to be uncertain. In par-
ticular, there is concern about NATO’s political cohesion with regard to its ‘out 
of area’ crisis management activities, but also with regard to its commitment to 
collective defence and its actual ability to deliver it. The operation in Libya was 
perceived as a crisis for NATO’s political cohesion, irrespective of the different 
interpretations of the causes of that crisis in the countries that took part in the 
operation (Denmark, Norway, Romania, Bulgaria) and those that stayed out. 
In addition, doubts have been expressed regarding NATO’s real capabilities to 
deliver collective defence, as the activity of NATO’s command structures and 
the capabilities of the biggest allies have been focused in recent years on crisis 
management operations. The new US defence strategy, adopted in January 
2012, has added to the uncertainty since it provides for a stepped up US po-
litical and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. This reorientation of 
US policy has provoked questions (even if not in all of the analysed countries) 
about how to ensure European security – both in terms of the crisis manage-
ment policy in the immediate neighbourhood of European NATO members, 
and in terms of collective defence. 
Other causes of the recent changes in the way the countries in question think 
about security include: the growing conviction that the EU’s Common Securi-
ty and Defence Policy project is a fiasco (which the operation in Libya made 
even more apparent), the shrinking defence budgets of the largest European 
allies, and even the lessons from the eurozone crisis. Given the deep divergenc-
es in security interests among the EU Member States, it is thought that there is 
little chance that Europe will develop a common security policy. 
Given the “unsteadiness” of what hitherto have been the pillars of European 
security, the growing unpredictability of Russia’s internal and foreign 
policies is adding to concerns in the context of increasing Russian defence 
spending, the reform of armed forces, military demonstrations close to NATO 
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borders (the Zapad and Ladoga military exercises, strategic bomber flights in 
the North) and hostile actions in the immediate neighbourhood in the past 
(the cyber attack against Estonia, the Russian-Georgian war). In the context of 
NATO’s transformation, the lack of cohesion in the European Union’s security 
policy, and the growing military capabilities and aggressive policies of Russia, 
concern has been growing over the increased likelihood of tensions and 
crises in strategically important regions such as the Barents Sea and the 
Arctic (due to the emerging opportunities for energy extraction, sea transport 
and fishing), or the Baltic and Black Sea regions (due to the development of 
marine transport of liquefied natural gas and oil, as well as the stepped up US 
military presence in the Black Sea region). 
Given their geographic situation, the Nordic states have been most acutely 
aware of those changes to the security environment (excepting Denmark due 
to its more continental and thus more comfortable geopolitical position). There-
fore, for the last couple of years those countries have been pursuing closer mil-
itary co-operation in order to maintain and increase their defence capabili-
ties, to expand military activity in the region (the Barents Sea and the Arctic, 
but also the Baltic Sea), and to improve interoperability (Sweden and Finland), 
thus indirectly enhancing the region’s defence capabilities. However, none of 
the Nordic states, including the non-members of NATO, i.e. Sweden and 
Finland, want their closer co-operation to undermine NATO’s dominant 
role in ensuring regional security. Another, equally important, priority in 
the co-operation of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark is the need to build 
up their expeditionary capabilities (including combat capabilities as well as 
training capabilities with a view to taking part in security sector reforms in 
developing countries). The Nordic states are seeking to develop a ‘brand’ for 
the region by co-operating on the military and civilian CSDP missions, op-
erations of NATO and the UN, and thus to present themselves as an effective 
partner of the United States in the global dimension. Given the United States’ 
perception of Europe as an inefficient ally in international security policy, the 
Nordic region aspires to the role of a smaller but more effective partner and 
partly expects the United States to maintain an interest in their own regional 
problems in return. As far as developing their ‘brand’ globally is concerned, 
the Nordic states are willing to include the Baltic states in their military co-
operation, and this willingness has already manifested itself in joint efforts on 
foreign missions, mainly in Afghanistan. 
Due to their geopolitical location and aspirations to reduce their energy de-
pendence on Russia and to mitigate Moscow’s influence, the Baltic states have 
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also been experiencing rising uncertainty about their broadly understood se-
curity. For the last several years, they have been co-operating more actively. 
This co-operation has taken place at the political level within NATO (joint lob-
bying for issues such as the adoption of contingency planning, for more US 
and NATO exercises in the region or for the extension of the Baltic Air Policing 
mission). To some extent, co-operation has also been stepped up at the mili-
tary level – with regard to Host Nation Support, and strengthening the Bal-
tic states’ visibility within NATO (by jointly contributing the Baltic Battalion 
to the Land Component of the NATO Response Force and the BALTRON Baltic 
Naval Squadron to SNMCMG1). However, co-operation has been hindered 
by the limited potential of the Baltic states’ armed forces, their disparate 
equipment and the divergent development directions of their respective 
military forces, as well as their preference for co-operation with larger 
strategic partners. A separate problem concerns the lack of political cohesion 
among the Baltic states. While Estonia pursues an unequivocal policy of keep-
ing Russia at arm’s length and integrating with the Euro-Atlantic structures, 
Latvia depends heavily on economic and business links with Russia, despite 
its pro-Atlantic attitude. Lithuania aspires to be the leader of the Baltic three, 
but its actions fail to match those ambitions (Lithuania’s defence spending as 
a proportion of GDP has been the lowest in the Baltic region and one of the low-
est in NATO in recent years). For geopolitical as well as financial and military 
reasons, the Baltic states have also been seeking closer military co-operation 
with their Nordic neighbours. However, in contrast to their stance on co-oper-
ation on foreign missions, the Nordic states are cautious about closer defence 
co-operation with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the region. The reasons for 
this include not only the limited military potential of the Baltic states, but also 
the potential of their conflicts with Russia, which could adversely affect the 
level of ‘Nordic’ security.
In Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic there is little concern about 
possible conflicts or incidents that could directly affect their military security 
(due to their relatively ‘safe’ geographic location). The mindset about potential 
threats among Poland’s partners from the V4 (and especially in their societies) 
is largely focused on energy and cyber security, threats to critical infrastruc-
ture, international organised crime and terrorism, as well as natural and in-
dustrial disasters, and, in the case of Hungary, also a possible destabilisation in 
the neighbouring Western Balkan countries. Therefore Hungary and Slovakia 
(the same applies to the Czech Republic, albeit to a smaller extent) are unwill-
ing to develop a closer military co-operation similar to the Nordic co-op-
eration and to invest in defence capabilities. While those countries are 
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concerned about the crisis and the eroding cohesion of NATO (and of the 
European Union), which they regard as the cornerstone of their security, 
this awareness does not translate into an impulse for them to increase 
their own defence capabilities or military spending. The countries in ques-
tion focus on political co-operation within NATO. Admittedly, the V4 can form 
a politically co-operating regional group within NATO (usually also with the 
Baltic states). Nevertheless, the approaches to the security and defence policies 
of the individual countries in the group may also diverge so that their positions 
on political and military initiatives extending beyond the NATO or EU frame-
works may differ considerably. For example, Slovakia and Hungary, then un-
der left-wing governments, were sceptical about the project to build elements 
of the US missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic.
Romania and Bulgaria are located on the border of several regions and face 
a relatively high likelihood of destabilisation and an ‘unfreezing’ of conflicts in 
their neighbourhood, both in the Western Balkans and in the Black Sea region 
and have thus been pointing to the existence of direct threats to their secu-
rity. Until now, however, the internal security challenges related to organised 
crime, illegal migration or international terrorism have been the biggest source 
of concern for both states. Romania and Bulgaria have been co-operating with 
the countries of the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region because such 
co-operation translates into internal and external security for them. Aware of 
the ineffectiveness of the existing multilateral co-operation structures in the 
two regions, Romania and Bulgaria have nonetheless been increasingly open 
to closer co-operation in bilateral formats: between Romania and Bulgaria, be-
tween Bulgaria and Greece, or between Romania and Turkey. The declining 
cohesion within NATO and the possibility of destabilisation in the immediate 
neighbourhood as a result of Russia’s actions has been ‘counterbalanced’ by 
Bulgaria’s and especially Romania’s ever closer co-operation with the United 
States. The two countries are hosting US logistics and transport bases in the vi-
cinity of the wider Middle East region and the Black Sea region, and elements 
of the US missile defence system are also to be deployed in Romania. The pri-
ority for Romania and Bulgaria is to fully adapt their armed forces to NATO 
standards, to acquire interoperability on foreign operations, and to increase 
their expeditionary capabilities as their contribution to their alliance with the 
United States. With its bigger military potential and political aspirations, Ro-
mania has also been seeking to develop closer co-operation with Central Eu-
rope, and Poland in particular, motivated by the geographic proximity, similar 
security interests (perceived threats, close relations with the US) and the need 
to strengthen Romania’s position in NATO and the EU.
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(2) Financial issues. Insufficient defence budgets have been as important 
a factor in stimulating the development of regional co-operation as have been 
changes in the security environment. However, the term ‘insufficient’ is rela-
tive and means different things depending on the region. In Northern Europe, 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Estonia have maintained or even slightly in-
creased the level of their defence spending. The remaining Baltic states and 
Poland’s partners in V4 have defence budgets ranging around 1% of GDP. The 
Czech Republic is a special case – after a period of small increases in defence 
spending, the country recently reported a major decrease due to public finance 
consolidation. The defence budgets of Romania and Bulgaria, currently in the 
range of 1.3–1.4% of GDP, have also reported decreases. 
In the case of countries with stable or growing defence budgets, the motivation 
to develop closer co-operation comes from the rising costs of acquiring arma-
ment and military equipment, which are ever more technologically advanced 
(the process is known as ‘techflation’). Joint purchases followed by co-opera-
tion throughout the life cycle of the product (servicing, modernisation, per-
sonnel training, exercises, joint use on foreign missions) are seen generating 
the biggest savings. The Nordic countries in particular co-operate in the area 
of armament and military equipment acquisitions – for example Sweden and 
Norway have co-operated on the purchase of the Swedish-made Archer self-
propelled howitzers and on their joint maintenance and exercises. Finland has 
purchased the Norwegian-made mid-range advanced surface-to-air missile sys-
tem NASAMS II, which has resulted in co-operation on personnel training and 
joint Finnish-Norwegian exercises. In the long term the Nordic countries might 
seek to better harmonise their defence planning and, consequently, make more 
joint purchases and make wider use of the same armament and military equip-
ment. The Baltic states, too, have begun to analyse the possibilities (quite modest 
in their case) to make joint purchases. In June 2012, they announced a joint ac-
quisition of ammunition for the Carl Gustav antitank recoilless rifle. Similar co-
operation has borne fruit also in the case of Finland and Estonia. The latter has 
joined the Finnish National Air Defence Modernisation Plan and will upgrade 
its radar system in a joint tendering procedure with Finland. Romania and Bul-
garia, as well as Croatia, are considering a joint purchase of multi-role fighter 
aircraft (this acquisition has been postponed for financial reasons). 
Research and analyses aimed at identifying possible savings are not only concerned 
with new acquisitions: they also extend to armament and military equipment 
already held, and the possibilities of shared servicing, upgrades, personnel train-
ing, exercises, use in foreign operations or the creation of joint military units. 
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Examples include work on a project to jointly use the C-130 transport aircraft held 
by Denmark and Norway (the J version) and Sweden (the E/H versions, with the 
acquisition of the newer J version possibly in the pipeline), and the co-operation on 
personnel training and operation among the countries that possess the Mi-8/17/171 
family of helicopters within the framework of the Czech-coordinated HIP Helicop-
ter Task Force. HIP has been joined by all the V4 countries and members from out-
side the region. As part of the Initiative, a Multinational Aviation Training Centre 
(MATC) is to be established in the Czech Republic. 
The extensive cuts in military spending, which has now dropped to as little as 
1% of GDP in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, are gradually erod-
ing the defence capabilities of those countries and is forcing them to seek 
partners willing to take on responsibility for some tasks related to the 
defence of national territory. This may lead to, inter alia, attempts at ceding 
responsibility for national defence tasks such as air policing onto NATO (Slo-
vakia may be the first V4 country with no combat air force at all). As budgets 
are contracting and become focused mainly on upgrading existing armament 
and military equipment, the decreasing spending is hardly an incentive to seek 
partners for new purchases and this restrains the opportunities for military 
co-operation. Moreover, in Slovakia and Hungary closer military co-operation 
is treated as a rationale for further cuts, rather than an impulse for capabilities 
development. Among Poland’s partners from the V4, only in the Czech Repub-
lic are involvement in regional co-operation and the resulting commitments 
treated as an argument in defending the military budget.
Co-operation in joint exercises and training is also a potential source of 
savings, and one that is the “easiest” to achieve. it is an important area in the 
co-operation of the Nordic states (the joint exercise programme for the years 
2012–2017), where it generates savings whilst also contributing to enhanc-
ing interoperability with regard to collaboration in the region and missions 
abroad. Co-operation has also been established among the Baltic states, espe-
cially with regard to Host Nation Support exercises. Lithuania, Latvia and Es-
tonia have declared that they would be willing to extend this co-operation to 
include more effective use of firing ranges and training centres and, possibly, 
to pursue some specialisation in this regard. Similarly, the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia and Hungary, as well as Romania and Bulgaria, are willing to co-operate 
in this area with various partners. 
The arms industries are also an important factor in the states’ willingness to seek 
partners for joint purchases. As defence spending in the individual countries and 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
15
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
12
/2
01
2
in NATO/EU as a whole declines or at best stands still, the need to maintain the 
domestic arms production and to promote the technological development of do-
mestic companies is an important consideration in setting the directions of possi-
ble military co-operation. In particular, countries that have large arms industries 
largely dependent on exports (Sweden, Norway, the Czech Republic) tend to seek 
partners for military co-operation based on the use of domestically manufactured 
armament and military equipment. Sweden and Norway in particular are active 
in this area, and the need to support their arms industries is an important factor in 
the two countries’ efforts to develop international military co-operation. They ob-
serve the directions in which the armed forces of countries in the broadly under-
stood region are developing, and their defence contractors often offer armament 
and equipment in combination with the offer of their armed forces on co-operation 
in service, upgrades, personnel training and exercises. Sweden has recently con-
cluded bilateral framework agreements with individual Baltic states to organise 
joint tenders for the purchase of armament, military equipment and ammunition. 
The government of the Czech Republic also supports the export of the products of 
its arms industry. Currently this support manifests itself mainly in efforts to find 
a buyer for the L-159 ALCA training and combat aircraft. Lithuania is one of the 
potential buyers, which could make the Czech Republic interested in extending 
the format of V4 co-operation to include the Baltic states (V4+B3). 
Another reason why countries seek partners for military co-operation con-
cerns the rising costs of participation in international missions. The Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland) are the leaders as far as de-
veloping operational co-operation abroad is concerned. In the short term, the 
Nordic states will seek to make savings by co-operating on the withdrawal of 
their contingents from Afghanistan (transport, logistics). In the longer term, 
they are considering broader co-operation abroad, ranging from the creation 
of joint logistic and transport facilities for foreign missions, to the creation of 
a joint battalion to deploy on UN peacekeeping operations. The Baltic states 
will be invited to join selected aspects of that co-operation. As regards the 
V4 countries, the NATO operations in which they have taken part so far have 
contributed to closer co-operation to a very limited extent only. Individual V4 
members have been and remain focused rather on co-operation with the “old” 
members of NATO. Similarly, Romania and Bulgaria have also tended to pre-
fer co-operation with their largest allies over working together with partners 
from the region. Joint participation in external operations therefore appears as 
a possible area of co-operation in view of the need to make savings. 
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2. CONCLUSIONS 
The above examples of co-operation, discussed in more detail in Part II, dem-
onstrate that there is no single blueprint for political and military co-opera-
tion. “regional co-operation” is merely a collective term for various bilateral 
or multilateral co-operation projects which do not even necessarily have to 
involve all countries in the given region. Nor is it possible to build a lasting 
and coherent regional security and defence coalition (within NATO or the EU) 
that would simultaneously include the Nordic states, the Baltic states, the V4 
members and Romania and Bulgaria. The formation of such a coalition would 
be hampered, first and foremost, by differences in the countries’ perceptions 
of security threats and challenges, qualitative and quantitative differences in 
military potential, as well as divergences in their short and medium term mo-
tivations and objectives for co-operation. 
Different constellations. The countries analysed here do not consider it ben-
eficial to limit their co-operation arrangements to their neighbours alone, for 
reasons which are both political (the aversion to the “regionalisation of secu-
rity”) and military (partners from outside the region may use or purchase the 
same armament and military equipment). They treat military co-operation 
with regional partners as the “core” of their armed forces co-operation ar-
rangements, but at the same time, depending on their political interests and 
military needs, they also develop co-operation with other partners, especially 
the United States; all of the countries in question (with the sole exception of 
Slovakia) regard the US as their main ally. Important partners of the Nordic 
countries include the United Kingdom (for Norway and Sweden), the Nether-
lands (for Norway, Finland and Denmark), Germany (for all Nordic states), and 
France (for Denmark). Important partners of the V4 partners include Germa-
ny, the United Kingdom (especially for the Czech Republic), Italy (mainly for 
Hungary) as well as Slovenia, Croatia and the Western Balkan countries. They 
have also raised the need to include Austria in military co-operation – the first 
meeting of the defence ministers of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Austria, Slovenia and Croatia took place in June 2012. Romania’s most impor-
tant partners (other than Bulgaria) include Turkey and Serbia. For Bulgaria, 
Greece is its second most important partner after Romania.
Different motivations and objectives of co-operation. In different regions, 
security and defence co-operation is based on different premises and serves 
different purposes. The Nordic co-operation has a clearly defined military ob-
jective (the priority is to keep and develop military capabilities, and to increase 
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effectiveness and interoperability), and a political objective, that being the 
desire to increase the visibility of the Nordic countries on foreign operations 
within NATO, the EU, UN, as well as vis-à-vis the US. With their attachment 
to sovereignty and co-operation traditions dating back to the 1950s, the Nor-
dic states have been able to generate impulses for co-operation on their own, 
without any “assistance” from NATO or the EU. The Baltic co-operation, on 
the other hand, largely serves political objectives (lobbying for Baltic concerns 
within NATO) and requires external impulses. At the military level, in recent 
years it has been focused on cooperation concerning Host Nation Support and 
on marking the Baltic states’ presence in NATO through their joint contribu-
tion to the NRF. The co-operation of the V4 so far has been focused mainly on 
its political objectives within NATO. It also has some military ambitions – the 
V4 countries have initiated joint projects aimed at developing co-operation be-
tween their armed forces and defence industries. However, the partners’ lim-
ited military potentials, political rivalries and competition between their arms 
industries have impeded any more ambitious undertakings. The objectives of 
the Black Sea co-operation between Romania and Bulgaria have been pri-
marily political, not military. The two countries have aimed at improving re-
gional stability and at creating a platform for communication and co-operation 
between the small and medium-sized Black Sea countries (Bulgaria, Georgia, 
Romania, Ukraine) and the dominant players in the region, i.e. Russia and Tur-
key. The aim of Romania and Bulgaria’s co-operation with the Western Balkan 
countries has been to support the integration of those countries with NATO 
and the EU.
Different potentials. In contrast to the defence potential of a state, which de-
pends on external and internal geographical, economic and political factors, 
military potential is defined by factors such as the number and the training 
quality of personnel, on mobilisation capacity, on the quantity, type and qual-
ity of equipment and the country’s capacity to replace it, as well as the organi-
sation of the armed forces. In this sense the armed forces of the countries 
in question have radically different potentials. Sweden and Romania, the 
only two countries that are relatively independent in terms of defence, have 
relatively large military potentials. In comparison, Finland and Norway have 
medium potentials, and the potentials of the remaining states are small. Dif-
ferent states also have different understandings of the role of the armed forces 
in their foreign and security policy. Sweden, Finland, Norway and Estonia 
treat their armed forces as guarantors of national security, while in the case 
of Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria, 
the armed forces are one of the tools of their foreign policy. In Slovakia and 
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Hungary the armed forces are of little significance even from the perspective 
of their foreign policy.
Different threat perceptions. The fact that the countries being analysed are 
neighbours and share a similar, peripheral status in NATO and the EU does 
not necessarily mean that they perceive the security challenges and threats 
the same way. While the hostile use of military means or pressure involving 
such means is regarded as a possible scenario in the Nordic-Baltic region, Po-
land’s partners from V4 or even Romania and Bulgaria do not treat such a sce-
nario as likely in the foreseeable future. Even the Nordic states, despite similar 
understandings of the changing security environment (with the exception of 
Denmark as mentioned above), are focused on threats coming from different 
directions (the Barents Sea/the Arctic, the Baltic Sea, land territory).
Different organisational frameworks. Countries of a given region de-
velop political and military co-operation both outside NATO, the EU and the 
UN (e.g. NORDEFCO), or within those structures. Joint acquisitions of arma-
ment and military equipment and following co-operation in service, person-
nel training and exercises tend to take the form of multilateral co-operation. 
Within NATO, countries work together on international operations (Sweden 
and Finland, Norway and Latvia, and Denmark and Estonia co-operate in Af-
ghanistan, while Denmark, Norway and Sweden have co-operated in Libya), 
within the framework of Partnership for Peace and NATO exercises in the 
region, and by making joint contributions to the NRF (NRF14: Denmark and 
the Baltic states) or by working within the NATO accredited Centres of Excel-
lence (the Cyber Defence Centre in Tallinn or the Energy Security Centre in 
Vilnius – the Baltic states have been lobbying for). Within the EU, Battle Groups 
are a form of bringing about further regional co-operation. The participating 
countries treat them as an instrument to emphasise the region’s activity in se-
curity policy, and as another form of co-operation with their neighbours (in 
the case of the Nordic, Czech-Slovak and the Visegrad Battle Groups) or with 
other partners important for the given state (the “107” and the Italian-Hungar-
ian-Slovenian Battle Group, the Balkan Battle Group, the Italian-Romanian-
Turkish Battle Group. See Appendices).
Different philosophies of co-operation. The Nordic states have been dem-
onstrating the most serious attitude to military co-operation – they are 
effective, efficient, they have clearly defined goals and the financial means to 
achieve them. They prefer a bottom-up approach that consists in a gradual 
and planned development of co-operation, and put more emphasis on results, 
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rather than the political visibility of their initiatives. The V4 members and, 
to some extent also Romania and Bulgaria, tend to start with ambitious 
declarations about co-operation, aimed at preserving military capabilities and 
building coalitions in order to increase (at least briefly) the region’s political 
visibility. They prefer a top-down approach: sometimes political initiatives are 
formulated and presented which have no basis in the proponent’s real capabil-
ity to implement them, and they produce little real military co-operation that 
could generate savings and benefit the armed forces.
Because of its geographic location and membership in NATO and the EU, Poland 
has access to the Nordic-Baltic region, holds a strong position in the Visegrad 
Group, and has the possibility to develop political and military co-operation 
with Romania and Bulgaria as they perceive the role of NATO and the relations 
with the US in a similar way. However, as different countries demonstrate dif-
ferent approaches to co-operation and possess different potentials and differ-
ent assets, Poland’s co-operation with them should aim at building networks 
of co-dependencies and links at the political, military and technological level, 
rather than attempting to create a joint political and military space. 
PART II 
 
REGIONAL CO-OPERATION, DEFENCE 
POLICIES, ARMED FORCES AND ARMS 
INDuSTRIES OF COuNTRIES ANALYSED
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I. THE NORDIC STATES
1. NORDIC DEFENCE CO-OPERATION
1.1. History of co-operation
During the Cold War, the catalogue of regional co-operation arrangements 
launched in the 1950s did not include any co-operation among the Nordic states 
on their national security issues. The first discussions on co-operation took 
place after 1991, and it was established only after Sweden and Finland joined 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. Initially, Nordic co-operation de-
veloped in three formats – NORDAC, NORDCAPS and NORDSUP – which in 
2009 became consolidated into the single structure of NORDEFCO. 
Since the 1990s, the task of NORDAC was to co-ordinate research into, and 
acquisitions of, military equipment. The success of this format is far from 
clear. The Standard Nordic Helicopter Programme, under which the Nor-
dic countries (Norway, Finland and Sweden only, since Denmark has opted 
out) ordered the NH90 helicopter, is seriously delayed and will not generate 
the expected savings from joint servicing, operation and upgrades because 
the partners ordered helicopters with different specifications and use them 
for different purposes. The joint project to build Viking submarines has also 
failed as the Nordic states ultimately decided not to co-operate on it. The suc-
cesses include the joint procurement by Sweden and Norway of the Swed-
ish-made Archer self-propelled artillery systems and co-operation in train-
ing, ammunition storage and servicing for those weapons. The co-operation 
between Norway and Finland on joint exercises using the NASAMS II mid-
range advanced surface-to-air missile system may serve as another example 
of successful co-operation (in 2009 Finland decided to buy the Norwegian-
made NASAMS II which also serves as an air defence system in the Norwe-
gian Armed Forces). 
In 1997 the Nordic states established NORDCAPS for the purposes of collabo-
ration on operations abroad. It was meant to replace the system of Nordic co-
operation on UN peacekeeping missions, which dated back to Cold War times. 
However, attempts at joint participation in foreign operations failed. While the 
Nordic states did manage to develop the so-called “forces catalogue”, which set 
out the contributions of individual nations with a view to deploying a joint unit 
at brigade-level, this intention was never put into practice. With the participa-
tion of the Nordic states in other international forces (EUBG, NRF), the Nordic 
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unit turned out to be redundant. Currently, structured Nordic co-operation 
abroad is most visible in the areas of training, capacity building and security 
sector reforms in the Eastern Africa Region, training for participants of peace-
keeping missions (Common Training for Peace Support Operations), and the 
armed forces reforms in the Western Balkans and Ukraine. 
The purpose of NORDSUP, established in 2008, was to explore the possibilities 
of co-operation on maintaining and developing capabilities. In 2007 Norway 
and Sweden, acting independently of each other, conducted analyses which 
showed that the biggest challenges facing the two countries would concern the 
rising costs of maintaining some capabilities and the decreasing numbers of 
troops. Co-operation between the Nordic armed forces was identified as a pos-
sible solution. Norway and Sweden started to explore the possibilities for such 
co-operation and were followed later on by Finland. A joint report published in 
2008 identified 140 potential areas of military co-operation. According to the 
report, the Nordic states would either have to share capabilities with strategic 
partners as part of bilateral or multilateral co-operation, or give up some of 
them. By harmonising military equipment, organising joint training for the 
Nordic armed forces and co-ordinating the use of national support and logis-
tics units or by creating such units jointly, Norway, Sweden and Finland, fol-
lowed later on in some aspects by Denmark, should seek thus to keep as much 
operational capabilities as possible. 
In parallel to analysing the possibilities of closer military co-operation, the 
Nordic states worked at the political level to step up their security and defence 
co-operation. Those efforts resulted in the 2009 Stoltenberg Report which 
set out thirteen proposals to strengthen co-operation in foreign and security 
policy. In a key section, the report called for a “mutual declaration of solidar-
ity”, i.e. a declaration on how each country would respond in the event of an 
attack against or pressure on another Nordic state. Such a declaration, ac-
cording to the Stoltenberg Report, was necessary to identify, at the political 
level, how joint military capabilities could be used in a crisis situation. Some 
of Stoltenberg’s proposals (mutual declaration of solidarity, joint air policing of 
Iceland, a joint amphibious unit, a joint maritime response force) were rejected 
by most Nordic states. Others became the object of analysis within the newly 
formed NORDEFCO (stabilisation task force and development of military co-
operation). Finally, some ideas, such as co-operation between foreign services, 
co-operation on cyber security or on Arctic issues, were taken up by the Nordic 
Council.
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1.2. Status of co-operation
As a consequence of this dual military and political process, coupled with 
the desire to consolidate the existing co-operation formats, the Nordic 
Defence Co-operation (NORDEFCO), was established in 2009. NORDEFCO 
was given an organisational structure and a mandate covering five areas of 
co-operation. The assumption was that co-operation within NORDEFCO would 
not have to include all participating countries and could be based on bilateral 
or trilateral co-operation which other partners could accede to at a later stage. 
The “Strategic Development” area aims at facilitating long-term defence co-
operation. Work is currently in progress to analyse the capabilities needed and 
possibly lacking in the future and to identify trends in the long-term defence 
planning of the Nordic states. In addition, possible areas of co-operation with 
regard to technological development are being considered, and staff officer ex-
changes have taken place. In the “Capabilities” area, the objective is to iden-
tify projects of co-operation within the timeframe of a few years: to harmonise 
and co-ordinate national capabilities development plans, to identify possible 
areas of co-operation in the servicing and maintenance of military equipment 
currently held and in purchases of new equipment (Archer and NASAMS II to 
date), and, subsequently, in its servicing and maintenance. Ten areas of such 
possible co-operation have been identified; the most promising project con-
cerns the co-ordination of tactical air transport (the C-130J transport aircraft), 
or even the creation of a joint Nordic air transport unit. Analyses are in pro-
gress concerning the creation of ‘Battalion Task Force 2020’, a joint unit that 
could be deployed on UN peacekeeping missions. In the “Human Resources 
and Education” area, the establishment of a Nordic Military Academy has been 
considered (without success), and the Centre for Gender in Military Opera-
tions has been established. In the “Training and Exercises” area, a combined 
joint Nordic exercise plan has been established for the years 2012–2017, which 
consolidated and expanded the national exercise plans: Norway, Sweden and 
Finland signed an agreement on regular joint exercises of air units in the High 
North; plans have been made for navy and air forces exercises in southern 
Scandinavia; Norway and Finland conduct joint exercises of the NASAMS II 
system; and Norway and Sweden organise joint exercises of the Archer artil-
lery system. In the “Operations” area, the main focus up to date has been on 
the mission in Afghanistan – the partners have been seeking joint solutions to 
increase their operational effectiveness and to cut costs. Sweden, Finland and 
Norway are co-operating in the operational mentoring (OMLT) of the Afghan 
army, and Swedish technical personnel are supporting a Norwegian unit of 
medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopters. Work is in progress to co-ordinate 
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Sweden’s, Finland’s and Norway’s logistics in northern Afghanistan, and co-
operation is most advanced in the area of military and non-military cargo 
transport to and from Afghanistan, co-ordinated by the Nordic Movement 
Coordination Centre. 
A number of factors facilitate Nordic Defence Co-operation. Firstly, there 
is the strategic proximity. The Nordic states have similar geographical loca-
tions and similar interests – they fear being marginalised in international se-
curity policy and seek to boost their significance in this field within NATO, the 
EU and the UN. Moreover, Norway, Sweden and Finland, which have been the 
core members of NORDEFCO until now, in ca. 2008 started again to perceive 
Russia as a direct or indirect threat to their territorial integrity and politi-
cal sovereignty. All the Nordic states view the USA and NATO as the guaran-
tors of regional security and stability. Secondly, the structural proximity of 
the Nordic states facilitates their co-operation. Within NATO and the EU, the 
Nordic countries count as rather “small” states. Due to their well-established 
co-operation in other areas, dating back several decades, the level of integra-
tion among the Nordic states is rather high and the positive effects of this co-
operation are visible for both their governments and societies. Finally, Nordic 
co-operation also benefits from cultural proximity. Similarities in language, 
work culture and identity have been a positive factor in extending the existing 
co-operation to the area of security and defence policy. 
From the point of view of the Nordic states, co-operation within NORDEFCO 
is aimed at generating two kinds of benefits. First of all, it is supposed to 
create economic gains. Co-operation is aimed at generating savings through 
smaller financial input in joint acquisitions, and opportunities for even 
more savings from joint training and exercises, joint maintenance, servicing 
and modernisation of armament and military equipment (with Archer and 
NASAMS II systems serving as examples). Co-operation is also expected to en-
able the Nordic countries to maintain their capabilities or to use them more 
effectively, while keeping spending levels unchanged, for example by more ef-
fectively operating the equipment used, jointly managing it or creating joint 
units (the C-130J transport aircraft). Finally, co-operation is also meant to in-
crease interoperability and the capability to act in unison.
The co-operation of the Nordic states is also aimed at generating gains in the do-
main of foreign and security policy. By co-operating on foreign missions (Libya, 
Afghanistan) or by working together to build capacity in developing countries, 
the Nordic states increase their visibility and boost their significance within 
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NATO and the EU, and as regards the USA. Nordic co-operation also enhances 
the region’s defence potential – not only because together the Nordic states 
“can afford more”. The ongoing co-operation of the NATO non-members (Swe-
den and Finland) with Denmark and Norway improves their interoperability 
and facilitates the adoption of NATO standards by the Swedish and Finnish 
armed forces. 
1.3. Prospects of co-operation
While the beginnings of NORDEFCO were enthusiastic and generated high ex-
pectations, the political and military feasibility of extending co-operation fur-
ther was soon called into question. 
While Russia’s aggressive actions in its neighbourhood were one of the fac-
tors that originally stimulated co-operation, they are also an impeding fac-
tor. Due to the differences in geographic location, the defence policies of the 
Nordic states have different geographical priorities: Sweden focuses on the 
Baltic Sea region and international operations, whereas Norway sees the 
High North as a priority and Finland views the defence of its land territory as 
the most important aspect. For Denmark, which does not consider itself to be 
threatened by Russia, international operations and, ever more importantly, 
engagement in the Arctic are and will probably remain a priority. Those dif-
fering perceptions of the directions of threats translate into different priori-
ties for the development of the armed forces: while Norway focuses on a Navy 
and Air Force capable of operating in Arctic conditions, Sweden puts the em-
phasis on a Navy and Air Force suitable primarily for operations in condi-
tions prevalent in the Baltic Sea region, Finland is seeking to have an Army 
and an Air Force capable of defending the country’s territory, and Denmark 
focuses on an Army able to operate on international operations, and a Navy 
capable of operating in Arctic conditions. In addition, the Nordic states very 
carefully analyse the implications of extending their military co-operation 
for the presence and activity of the US and NATO in the region. They do not 
want their co-operation to be interpreted as assuming more responsibility 
for the security and defence of a broadly understood Northern Europe (the 
Baltic and the Barents Sea regions) because their military potential is insuf-
ficient for that purpose. The Nordic states will therefore avoid any initiatives 
that could be seen as conducive to a “regionalisation of security”. As a NATO 
member, Norway in particular does not wish to see NATO’s commitments 
under Article 5 with regard to the High North relativised in view of its closer 
co-operation with the NATO non-members, Sweden and Finland. Assuming 
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responsibility for the security of the Baltic Sea region is equally unacceptable 
for Sweden and Finland. The policies of the two countries, and of Finland in 
particular (due to its long border with Russia), are guided by strong tradi-
tions of non-alignment and an aversion to becoming entangled in conflicts 
in the Baltic Sea region. In order to prevent a “regionalisation of security” 
the Nordic states have therefore been developing links with the USA and the 
largest NATO members in order to involve them in regional security issues. 
Therefore, the idea proposed in the Stoltenberg Report that the aim of co-
operation among the Nordic states should be for them to assume more re-
sponsibility for their security is unlikely to materialise.
However, Nordic co-operation can be expected to result in concrete military 
projects. The countries will co-operate to jointly develop or purchase arma-
ment and military equipment, and to service and upgrade it, they will also co-
operate on exercises and training, and on international operations. Several 
flagship projects (transport, logistics) can also be expected to take place, with 
a view to jointly conducting foreign operations. In the long term (10–20 years), 
if the co-operation experience is generally positive, the Nordic states may seek 
to further harmonise their defence planning, and, consequently, make more 
joint procurements and to use the same armament and military equipment to 
a greater extent. In the case of Norway, Sweden and Finland, such projects will 
not be allowed to restrict the autonomy of their political decisions or their op-
erational sovereignty, or make them dependent on partners in using capabili-
ties to defend their territory. One should therefore expect more pooling than 
sharing of roles and tasks among the partners. All Nordic states would like 
to see their co-operation in terms of “smart defence”, i.e. maintaining certain 
capabilities at the current level or developing them, but without creating ex-
cessive military dependencies. While such “technical” co-operation may cre-
ate more synergy among the security and defence policies of the Nordic states, 
NATO and relations with the USA and major European allies will remain the 
main principal guarantee of security for Denmark and Norway, while Sweden 
and Finland seek such guarantees in their non-aligned status combined with 
growing co-operation with NATO and their active policy within the EU. How-
ever, if NATO continues to erode in the future, Nordic co-operation may pro-
vide a good basis for deeper regional integration. 
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2. DENMARK
2.1. Defence policy
Denmark’s defence policy is defined by the absence of the perception of 
a military threat and by the country’s aspiration to avoid marginalisa-
tion in the EU (despite opting out of the eurozone and the CSDP) while pre-
serving the country’s significance in international politics. After German 
unification and the accession of Poland and the Baltic states to NATO, Denmark 
no longer considers itself to be under a threat militarily. However, the question 
of maintaining political sovereignty combined with the concern about possible 
marginalisation in an enlarged European Union centred on the united Germa-
ny or the Franco-German tandem is an issue for Copenhagen. Denmark has 
therefore opted out of the eurozone and the CSDP, and has been co-operating 
closely with the United States, especially in the area of security and defence 
policy. Since around 2007, Denmark has also become more actively involved in 
Arctic issues, to which the country has “access” by running Greenland’s for-
eign and security policy. Activity in forums dealing with Arctic issues, as well 
as Denmark’s efforts to step up its presence in the region, should be seen pri-
marily as part of its strategy to maintain a significant position in the interna-
tional arena. Economic interests are of secondary importance in this context 
(oil and gas extraction benefits the autonomous government of Greenland), 
and so is military security, as Denmark is not involved in any territorial dis-
putes with Russia (while there exist competing Danish, Russian and Canadian 
claims to the continental shelf in the Arctic, all the parties have agreed that 
these issues would be regulated by the UN Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf). Facing no direct military threats to its national security, 
Denmark has been able to adopt, and adapt itself to, the US understanding of 
broadly defined security threats. The Georgian-Russian conflict did not affect 
the Danish threat perception of its own security or the security of NATO. Rus-
sia is a source of problems in the Arctic for Denmark, but not a military threat. 
Russian policy is regarded as pragmatic, with a tendency to strengthen its 
influence in its nearest neighbourhood. Denmark seeks to develop pragmatic 
economic relations with Russia. Similarly, in the area of security and defence 
policy, it pursues a policy of limited military co-operation and includes Russia 
in, for example, Danish-led military exercises. 
Close partnership with the USA has been the foundation of Denmark’s 
security since the 1990s. Denmark has been and remains the USA’s „Mus-
terknabe” in Europe, i.e. a model ally that quickly responds and adapts to the 
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transformations of US and NATO policies. The US-Denmark partnership in 
security policy consists in: the involvement of the Danish Armed Forces in 
foreign operations initiated by the US along with Denmark’s readiness to take 
part in high-intensity operations; bilateral military co-operation leading to 
a high level of interoperability; support for US security policy; and a readiness 
to participate in US initiatives within NATO (Denmark has supported the de-
velopment of the US missile defence system, has given its consent to the up-
grade of the radar in Thule, Greenland, and its incorporation into the system, 
and is considering to incorporate (following a possible upgrade) the I. Huitfeldt 
frigates into the EPAA). Under the new social democratic and socialist govern-
ment (in power since autumn 2011) Denmark’s “Super-Atlanticism” developed 
under the right-wing governments of 2001–2011 may at most evolve towards 
“Atlanticism” and greater involvement in UN operations. 
Denmark’s active involvement in NATO’s crisis management is also motivated 
by a conviction that NATO (with relations with the USA at its core) guaran-
tees the security of Europe. The USA’s reorientation towards the Asia-Pacific 
region has provoked hardly any discussion in Denmark – it is perceived as 
a logical development in US policy. Denmark will presumably try to “adapt” 
to this new US strategy in such a way as to remain an important ally for the 
USA. Consequently, one should also expect an adjustment of Denmark’s policy 
within NATO. As more and more emphasis in international security policy is 
being placed on a civil-military approach to crisis management, Denmark will 
step up its involvement in security sector reforms and reconstruction activi-
ties in developing countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, East Africa, the Balkans, 
Georgia and Ukraine have been mentioned in this context), in addition to its 
continued involvement in high-intensity operations. Denmark will therefore 
develop “flexible capabilities” with troops capable of performing a wide range 
of tasks, including partly civilian ones. It will also step up its civilian engage-
ment abroad (development co-operation, police, judges) and enhance the co-
ordination of civilian and military activities. 
In the opinion of most political parties in Denmark, opting out of military co-
operation under the CSDP is not in the interests of Denmark. The right-wing 
government, which depended on the support of the nationalist right, did not 
hold a referendum on this issue. The current government are also unlikely 
to hold a referendum due to the troubles of the eurozone, which have been 
adversely affecting the popularity of further integration within the EU. The 
fact that Denmark has opted out of the CSDP means that the country does not 
participate in the EU’s military operations, in contrast to civilian operations. 
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Should the number of the EU’s civil-military operations increase, this could 
result in Denmark remaining outside most EU missions. 
The regional dimension of military co-operation (NORDEFCO) has until 
recently been of little interest to Denmark. However, considering the cuts in 
military spending, the current government has announced that it will seek to 
step up Nordic co-operation in areas such as joint acquisitions, operations and 
the maintenance of military equipment, as well as in education and training. 
2.2. Armed forces and the arms industry
The Danish Armed Forces (18,000 troops in peacetime, 125,000 in wartime) 
have limited potential but are an important instrument of Denmark’s for-
eign and security policy. They include an operational component (the Army, 
the Navy and the Air Force) and the formally separate Home Guard. Military 
service is based on universal conscription (today of a rather voluntary nature), 
but the decisive majority of personnel (over 80%) are professional soldiers. The 
Danish Armed Forces are relatively well equipped and trained, with large ex-
peditionary capabilities, but the potentials and capabilities of different branch-
es vary. Military spending has oscillated around 1.4% of GDP in recent years, 
corresponding to approximately US$ 4.5 billion. A quarter of this spending is 
earmarked for investment. The reorganisation and downsizing of the Armed 
Forces, now in progress, has been motivated by the need to reduce spending. As 
a result of this process, from 2015 spending is expected to decrease to US$ 4.1–4.2 
billion. Denmark has consistently been transforming its military, moving from 
an armed forces that were concentrated on defence tasks towards a mobile crisis 
response force. Since 2005, the Armed Forces have been undergoing a reorgani-
sation aimed at increasing their expeditionary capabilities (to 60% of the Armed 
Forces’ potential) and downsizing the structures responsible exclusively for de-
fence of national territory (further reductions should be expected). In this way, 
Denmark has been able to maintain its intensive involvement in international 
operations without increasing the budget. 
The Army is the largest branch of the Danish Armed Forces. The core of its 
operational component consists of two mechanised brigades, including one in 
basic readiness as Danish commitment to NATO Response Force (NRF), and an 
elite special forces battalion. The Army has high expeditionary capabilities (at 
75% of the Armed Forces’ potential). Its equipment represents various levels 
of technological advancement: the Leopard 2A5DK tanks, the CV9035 infantry 
fighting vehicles and the Piranha III armoured personnel carriers (in service 
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in the units that maintain combat readiness) can be regarded as state-of-the 
art. However, the Army’s basic personnel carrier remains the repeatedly up-
graded M113. The Navy has relatively high strike capability and is also the 
most technologically advanced branch of the Armed Forces. It is a primarily 
oceanic fleet consisting of a component responsible for defending economic 
interests (mainly fisheries) in the Northern Atlantic, and a component for 
strictly combat purposes, which has been fully re-armed in recent years (for 
example, it received state-of-the-art missile frigates). Denmark has given up 
its submarine and coastal forces. Patrolling functions have been fully taken 
over by the maritime component of the Home Guard. In 2012 the Island Com-
mand Greenland and the Island Command Faeroes were reorganised and the 
Arctic Command was created in order to better patrol the sea (fisheries, trans-
port, sea rescue operations). The Air Force mainly performs support and aux-
iliary tasks. There are two strictly combat-oriented squadrons equipped with 
the F-16A/B fighter aircraft, of which one is Danish commitment to the NRF. 
The Air Force combat units are not operationally independent and co-operate 
closely with NATO. The Air Force’s equipment is now largely obsolete, and an 
upgrade has been planned. The helicopter and transport aircraft fleets have 
been replaced. Due to financial considerations, no decision to replace the ob-
solete combat component with F-35 fighters has yet been made, and the F-16 
fighter aircraft still in service are to be modernised. Denmark has also decided 
not to have a ground component for its air defence. The Home Guard for the 
most part is a complementary and lighter component of the Army, even though 
selected units are assigned to the other service branches.
The independent ability of the Danish Armed Forces in the regular defence of 
the country’s territory is limited, and the Air Force is in fact unable to carry out 
operations on its own. Given the total potential of the Armed Forces, Denmark 
has considerable expeditionary capabilities: it can even deploy an independent 
land troops contingent (complete with its own logistic facilities). What limits 
Denmark’s ability to participate in foreign operations is the absence of a means 
to transport heavy arms and military equipment. The Danish Air Force can take 
part in foreign operations only as part of a contingent deployed by another state. 
On the other hand, Denmark can relatively independently carry out naval op-
erations that are not directly related to defence of national territory. This is pri-
marily because of the interests it has in the Northern Atlantic and the Arctic.
Denmark has a small arms industry. The country imports most of its ar-
mament and military equipment (from the USA, Germany, the UK, France, 
Sweden and Switzerland). Danish companies mainly deal with overhauls and 
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upgrades. They also produce components for imported armament, such as 
electronics or radio-electronics (Terma, NEA Lindberg), optoelectronics and 
equipment and armour elements (Falck-Schmidt Defence Systems), as well as 
command and communication systems (Maersk Data Defence). Owing to their 
high technological level, they are able to participate in major armament devel-
opment programmes, including the F-35 (Terma). The companies listed above 
are privately owned, usually small, and are oriented largely towards the civil-
ian market. The only industry capable of providing almost fully for the needs 
of the Danish Armed Forces is the shipbuilding sector (Odense Steel Shipyard), 
which, nevertheless, cannot equip or arm the ships it builds without the in-
volvement of external partners. 
3. FINLAND
3.1. Defence policy
The strategic context of Finland’s defence policy is defined by the per-
ception of Russia as the greatest challenge to Finland’s security. Finland 
views Russia in terms of a military and non-military threat, but also as a source 
of economic opportunities. The scenarios on which defence planning is based 
mainly refer to Russia, with which Finland shares a 1,300 kilometre long bor-
der, despite the fact that, officially, Finland regards no country as a threat. Fin-
land does not rule out the possibility that it might face political, economic or 
military pressure (the threat of (limited) use of force), crises in the Baltic Sea 
region with implications for Finland’s security, or a strategic attack against its 
territory. In addition, it is concerned about possible non-military threats re-
sulting from political or economic instability in Russia, the pollution of sea or 
inland waters, or nuclear energy generation and nuclear waste disposal. The 
Russian-Georgian war was a reminder for Finland that being the neighbour of 
a country that pursues increasingly assertive and aggressive policies involves 
potential threats. At the same time, however, Russia is one of Finland’s most 
important trade partners and the supplier of 70% of the energy consumed in 
the country (oil, gas and electricity). Russians also account for the largest pro-
portion of tourists visiting Finland, and the largest immigrant community. 
For this reason the priority for Finland is, on the one hand, to maintain the 
ability to defend its territory and, on the other, to work extensively with Rus-
sia and develop deeper political, economic and social relations along with co-
operation on environmental protection and justice and internal affairs as well 
as working with Russia’s border regions with a view to mitigating non-military 
threats. Finland also maintains regular military relations with Russia. 
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Finland is a non-aligned state whose priority is placed on the ability to 
independently defend its territory. At the same time, however, it actively 
participates in UN and EU crisis management operations and develops co-op-
eration with NATO. It is traditionally important for the country to develop its 
security policy within the United Nations framework. Recently Finland has 
been again stepping up its involvement in UN missions in connection with its 
aspiration to membership in the UN Security Council in 2013–2014. 
Membership in the EU and the eurozone is in part perceived as a way to en-
hance national security. Finland has also been actively involved in the develop-
ment of the CFSP and the CSDP, aimed at preventing the EU from transforming 
into a collective defence organisation. Finland does not want to be committed 
to defend, for example, the Baltic states, and therefore its attitude towards the 
inclusion of a mutual defence clause into the Treaty of Lisbon was one of cau-
tion. Currently Finland considers the clause to be strengthening political soli-
darity in the EU (it does not, however, affect the security and defence policies 
of certain Member States, e.g. Finland), and since there are no EU planning 
and command structures, it views NATO as still being in charge of collective 
defence of its European members. Finland’s participation in the CSDP is also 
aimed at strengthening the country’s political position in the EU and at boost-
ing its defence capabilities (through more interoperability and opportunities 
to co-operate within international commands and units). For these reasons, it 
is important for Finland to participate in EU operations and Battle Groups with 
its priority partners (Sweden in the NBG and Germany in the “107”; see Appen-
dices). Finland also supports the operational use of Battle Groups. 
It has been stepping up co-operation with NATO since the mid-1990s and treats 
its involvement in Partnership for Peace (since 1994) and NATO training, exer-
cises and operations as an instrument in the transformation of its Armed Forc-
es which enhances interoperability and competences and thus also capabilities 
to defend the country’s territory and to co-operate with NATO members in this 
regard. In 2012, Finland also joined the NRF (the ABC laboratory), and in the 
coming years it plans to contribute a special forces unit, an Air Force unit (F/A-
18) and an amphibious unit to the NRF. A debate has been underway for several 
years about Finland’s possible accession to NATO. Arguments for and against 
this have been raised. It is unlikely that Finland will seek to join NATO in the 
immediate future. The country will rather continue to develop co-operation 
(operations, training, exercises in the Baltic Sea region), even though it has 
expressed concern about the future status of NATO’s partner states after the 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. In Finland’s view, the USA plays a key 
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role in European security, and especially the security of the Baltic Sea. Any 
change in this respect (reducing the US presence, but also stepping it up) in-
volves risks. Finland’s co-operation with the US takes place within the frame-
work of PfP and the collaboration of the arms industries. 
Regional co-operation within NORDEFCO is a way for Finland to indirectly 
develop co-operation with NATO (via Norway and Denmark) in terms of inter-
operability, procedures and standards, as possible accession to NATO remains 
a controversial issue at home. So far, however, Finland has been cautious about 
extending Nordic co-operation, especially with regard to issues that concern 
the defence of national territory. The country is more open to co-operation on 
crisis management, e.g. in Africa. The savings planned by the Defence Minis-
try will probably prompt Finland to become more open for co-operation in the 
domain of harmonising armament and military equipment and, consequently, 
joint purchases, servicing, upgrades, etc. within the NORDEFCO framework.
3.2. Armed forces and the arms industry
The Finnish Armed Forces have a medium potential (15,000 troops in 
peacetime with the capacity to quickly expand to 34,700 within the op-
erational component, and a large mobilisation capacity of 350,000 in war-
time). They are therefore treated as a genuine guarantor of the state’s 
security. The Armed Forces include an operational component consisting of 
the Army, Air Force and Navy, as well a voluntary home guard (Local Defence 
troops). Military service is based on universal conscription. The Armed Forces 
are relatively well equipped and trained (the operational component trains on 
a permanent basis), but the potentials and capabilities of the different service 
branches differ. Military spending centres on approximately 1.5% of GDP, i.e. 
approximately US$ 3.5 billion. Around 25% of spending is earmarked for in-
vestments. In 2012 Finland started implementing a programme of financial 
savings. While the structure and tasks of the Armed Forces will remain un-
changed, cuts in the defence infrastructure have been planned that will in-
volve reducing the number of personnel (to 12,300 in peacetime and 230,000 in 
war time) by 2015. As part of the parallel changes started in 2010, the Finnish 
Armed Forces intend to expand their capability to carry out regular operations 
(by forming a Corps Command and consolidating the home guard defence ef-
fort, along with other measures). 
The Army is the largest branch of the Armed Forces. During peacetime, it 
does not have any fully developed tactical level units, although the three 
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best-equipped mechanised brigades maintain basic readiness. The structure 
of the Army also includes two infantry brigades and two armoured brigades, 
as well as independent regiments (two general regiments, one air defence regi-
ment, one engineering regiment, one signal regiment and a special regiment 
with independent special forces and helicopter battalions). The Army is largely 
saturated with armament and military equipment, even though the techno-
logical levels of various items of equipment vary. State-of-the-art equipment 
includes the CV9030 infantry fighting vehicles the AMV XA-360 wheeled ar-
moured personnel carriers the XA-361 self-propelled mortars and the 155 mm 
GH 52 APU gun howitzers. Other items in the Army’s equipment have been 
only partly upgraded and their technological standards date back to the 1980s. 
Older types of armament are gradually being decommissioned. The Finnish 
Army is developing its offensive capabilities – it has plans to purchase 70 tacti-
cal missile launchers from the USA. In addition to the operational component’s 
cadre there is also the volunteer home guard (Local Defence troops) which 
forms a lighter component of the Army. The Local Defence troops are well-de-
veloped in wartime and are able to deploy six infantry brigades, among other 
units. The Air Force is relatively modern and is strictly combat-oriented. At its 
core there are three squadrons of F/A-18C/D Hornet multi-role fighter aircraft 
(with a large modernisation potential) and a training squadron. The Air Force 
has developed tactical transport capabilities in recent years (the CASA C-295 
transport aircraft, more of which are to be purchased). Its structure includes 
no ground-based air defence units (they are in the structure of the Army) and 
all helicopters are held by the Army. The Navy has no bigger vessels. Its core 
consists of two flotillas of missile boats and a flotilla of minelayers. The Navy 
plans to acquire larger multi-role vessels by 2020. It is notable that the Finn-
ish Navy has a relatively large number of coastal units. In the coming years it 
plans to form and equip four land-based anti-ship missile batteries.
The Finnish Armed Forces (and especially the Army and the Navy) have a rela-
tively high capability to independently carry out regular defence of national 
territory. In the case of the Air Force, the capability to operate independently 
hinges on the available stockpiles of spare parts and armament and/or exter-
nal support. With its mobilisation potential and well-developed home guard, 
the Finnish Armed Forces have extensive capability to conduct irregular op-
erations, including guerrilla warfare in areas taken by the enemy (largely 
owing to the climate and terrain conditions). The profile of the arms industry 
has been adjusted to this situation: it enables Finland to independently carry 
out operations (both regular and irregular) on land. The ability of the Finnish 
Armed Forces to take part in operations abroad, on the other hand, is limited. 
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Selected units of the Army can take part in such operations (the Air Force and 
the Navy have not been adequately adapted), however, as their expeditionary 
logistic capacity is low, they can do so only within other states’ contingents.
Finland has an extensive arms industry in which companies producing 
armament and military equipment for the Army play a dominant role. 
The Patria Group is a potentate (Vammas, Vehicles, Hagglunds) and provides 
nearly all armament and military equipment for the infantry, mechanised and 
artillery units (including air defence). Finland is also a leader in the ballistic 
protection market (Ballistic Protection Burgmann, Verseidag Ballistic Protec-
tion, Exote Armour, FY-Composites, Temet). Moreover, it caters for the demand 
for broadly understood electronics (Control Express Finland, Electro-Hill, Ele-
ktrobit, Elesco). These range from subassemblies for armament systems, in-
cluding for the Air Force (Insta Defence & Security), to simulators and training 
equipment (Noptel). Finnish companies also produce ammunition (NAMMO 
Lapua) and products for CBRN security (Environics). Finland has no aerospace 
industry, and the capacity of its shipbuilding sector is limited. The USA and 
Sweden remain the principal suppliers of the Finnish Armed Forces.
4. NORWAY
4.1. Defence policy
The strategic context of Oslo’s defence policy is defined by challenges in the 
Norwegian High North which includes the wider Barents Sea region with the 
Svalbard archipelago. The expanding opportunities of oil and gas extraction, 
maritime transport and fishing in that region are a guarantee of further eco-
nomic growth for Norway, but also a source of potential threats. Those threats 
may be “civil” in nature (accidents related to energy resource extraction or more 
intensive shipping), or “military” (crises/conflicts over oil and gas extraction or 
fisheries). Russia is perceived as the main challenge in this context, and this per-
ception has gained prominence since Russia resumed strategic bomber flights 
in the North (2007) and since the Russian-Georgian war (2008). Norway neither 
rules out the possibility that it may face limited Russian pressure involving the 
use of force aimed at forcing a change in Norway’s policy, nor even a military 
conflict. The status of Svalbard remains a potential source of conflict in bilateral 
relations. Norway’s policy towards Russia seeks: (1) to minimise risk in bilateral 
relations (hence the 2010 agreement on the delimitation of the maritime bor-
der and on co-operation, and also Norway’s refusal to incorporate the F. Nansen 
frigates into the Aegis system); (2) to develop co-operation (building civil and 
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military contacts, the joint POMOR military exercises); (3) to “deter” (by em-
phasising Norway’s right and ability to enforce its sovereign rights, increasing 
defence spending, stepping up its military presence and developing its capabili-
ties in the High North, and ensuring NATO’s presence on Norwegian territory in 
part through the Cold Response exercises). 
Norway treats the United States as its most important ally, with whom 
it maintains very close bilateral relations (co-operation between the arms in-
dustries and in military equipment acquisitions, the MCPPN programme for 
the storage of US military equipment). At the same time, however, the coali-
tion of the social democrats and socialists, which has been in power in Norway 
since 2005, has left some room for manoeuvre on issues that are regarded as in-
compatible to the leftist worldview (manifested by the Norwegian withdrawal 
from Iraq and OEF operation in Afghanistan, opposition to the US missile de-
fence system in the shape proposed by G.W. Bush) or issues that might increase 
tensions in the High North (e.g. the F. Nansen frigates case mentioned above). 
Within NATO, Norway has been arguing since 2008 that the capabilities to de-
fend NATO’s territory and those for crisis management operations should be 
balanced. It has also advocated a broader interpretation of Article 5 and a “low 
threshold” for the convening of consultations under Article 4. Norway has ar-
gued that the defence planning process should be based on various threat sce-
narios, that regional contingency planning should be restored, that expertise on 
specific geographic areas and situational awareness near NATO’s borders should 
be enhanced, that links should be created between the national commands and 
NATO’s command structures, and that collective defence capabilities should be 
improved, for example by NATO command structures participating to a greater 
extent in national exercises. Norway will not give up its participation in NATO’s 
crisis management, though, treating this as a way to build its own internation-
al position and as a contribution to the maintenance of transatlantic relations. 
However, it now places more emphasis on a number of factors when consider-
ing its engagement in operations abroad, such as the impact of the foreign de-
ployments on its capabilities to defend national territory, the existence of a clear 
UN mandate, and political gains in relations with the USA and NATO. As with 
Denmark, Norway expects that involvement in reforms or the development of 
security sectors in developing and post-conflict countries will gain impor-
tance within NATO after 2014. Norway views the USA’s reorientation towards 
the Asia-Pacific region as a logical way to adjust to the new global conditions. 
However, it also believes that the US will continue to need NATO as a channel 
through which it can influence European countries and as a body co-legitimising 
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US military actions, and also because of the US military bases in Europe. As Eu-
rope’s relative importance for the USA will continue to decline, Norway is seek-
ing to make as much use as possible of the US pledge to step up its presence in 
Europe through exercises and training. In the context of collective defence, cuts 
in defence spending by European countries are a much more serious concern for 
Norway than the USA’s reorientation. In Norway’s view, this process may lead to 
a renationalisation of the defence policies of NATO member states in the worst 
case, or broader co-operation within NATO in the best case. 
As a non-member of the European Union, Norway has been involved for sev-
eral years in the CSDP (through information exchange agreements with the 
EDA, participation in operations, NBG and pooling & sharing projects). In the 
past, this policy stemmed from fears that Norway could become marginalised 
if a strong CSDP emerged and if multilateral dialogue within NATO trans-
formed into a USA–EU dialogue. Currently Norway is more concerned about 
the risk that transatlantic relations could erode. Nevertheless, Norway contin-
ues to take part in practical co-operation projects, while considering the CSDP 
to be an obsolete political project. At the same time, it has expressed concern 
that the instruments provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon might make it more 
difficult for third countries to join co-operation. 
Finally, Norway’s defence policy also includes the aspiration to step up 
political and military co-operation in the region. The objectives are, on the 
one hand, to jointly develop capabilities while maintaining autonomy in politi-
cal and operational decisions (within NORDEFCO) – the main motivation here 
comes from insufficient financial resources and the need to maintain capabili-
ties or to make them more effective. On the other hand, Norway is seeking to 
strengthen political and military co-operation and dialogue in Northern Eu-
rope (within the Northern Group) in response to the USA’s reorientation and 
transformation of NATO. Multilateral military co-operation with its partners 
and allies (within NORDEFCO and the Northern Group) is, according to the 
Norwegian defence ministry’s strategic document for the years 2013–2016, the 
third most important priority of the country’s security and defence policy (af-
ter enhancing NATO’s reliability and Norway’s own defence capabilities, and 
ahead of involvement in foreign operations).
4.2. Armed forces and the arms industry
The Norwegian Armed Forces have a medium potential (23,000 troops in 
peacetime and 83,000 in wartime) and are regarded as the guarantor of 
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the state’s security. They include an operational component (the Army, the 
Air Force and the Navy) and Home Guard. The Armed Forces are relatively 
well-equipped and trained (the operational component trains on a regular ba-
sis), and saturated with special forces units, but the potentials and capabilities 
of the different service branches vary widely. Norway has a mixed manning 
system: combat readiness units are manned with professional soldiers and 
universal conscription is increasingly voluntary. Military spending in recent 
years has been centred around 1.6% of GDP, corresponding to approximately 
US$ 6 billion. A quarter of this amount is earmarked for investments. In 2013–
2016, the military budget is expected to increase by 7% in real terms. The re-
structuring and modernisation, which have been underway for several years, 
are aimed at maintaining a high level of military presence and at developing 
capabilities to act in the High North, with participation in international op-
erations being seen as a secondary objective. Because of the focus on the High 
North, the development of the Navy has been the top priority; the Air Force is 
currently undergoing modernisation, and investments in the Army and the 
Home Guard are beginning. 
The Navy has the highest strike capability and is more technologically ad-
vanced than the remaining branches (for example, in recent years it acquired 
five state-of-the-art missile frigates). The Navy’s oceanic component and the 
Coast Guard and the Coastal squadron (units at sea and on land) are being de-
veloped in parallel (e.g. the Coast Guard is currently being equipped with mod-
ern missile corvettes). The Air Force mainly plays auxiliary and support roles. 
It has been partly upgraded – the helicopter and transport aircraft fleets have 
been replaced, and two air defence squadrons have been equipped with state-
of-the-art NASAMS II mid-range advanced surface-to-air missile system. The 
combat component (three squadrons of F-16A/B) is already obsolete, and a de-
cision has been taken to purchase F-35 fighter aircraft, the first of which will 
enter service around 2018. The Army is the largest branch of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces. Its core consists of a well-developed brigade (the Brigade Nord). 
The technological level of the Army’s equipment varies. The CV9030 infan-
try fighting vehicles are the only item that can be considered state-of-the-art. 
Other kinds of armament and equipment have either been upgraded (the M113 
armoured personnel carriers), are being upgraded (the Leopard 2A4 tanks), or 
are being replaced (by the new Archer artillery system). In addition to the pur-
chase of the F-35 fighter aircraft, the 2013–2016 long-term defence plan provides 
for increased investments in the Army (including the formation of an Arc-
tic Battalion). The Home Guard is a lighter component within the Army, but 
some of its units are also assigned to the other branches of the Armed Forces. 
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Norway has increased spending on the development and modernisation of de-
fence infrastructures – which are used mainly by the Home Guard – six-fold in 
recent years, and the training of Home Guard units has been stepped up. Under 
the plan mentioned above, funding for the acquisition of new armament for 
the Home Guard has been allocated. 
The ability of the Norwegian Armed Forces to independently defend the coun-
try’s territory is limited, and the Air Force in fact has no ability to carry out 
independent operations. The well-developed Home Guard, on the other hand, 
ensures good capabilities to carry out irregular operations. The ability of the 
Army to take part in international operations is even more limited. The Army 
and the Air Force can take part in missions only as part of contingents de-
ployed by other states. The Norwegian Navy is relatively independent in carry-
ing out operations that are not directly related to defence of national territory 
(and a logistics component of the fleet is being developed in order to further 
increase this capability). 
Norway has an extensive arms industry, dominated by companies that 
mainly produce munitions such as ammunition (Nammo Raufoss), missiles 
and launchers (the world potentate Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace), small 
arms (Vapensmia), as well as electronic and optoelectronic components for 
armament and training equipment (Kvaerner Eureka, Simrad Optronics) and 
command and service support systems (Kvaerner Eureka). The Norwegian 
shipbuilding industry played a considerable role in building the state-of-the-
art warships for the Norwegian fleet (Umoe Mandal; the frigates were built 
in co-operation with Spain). Norway has no aerospace industry, and does not 
produce heavy armament. The United States remains the main supplier for the 
Norwegian Air Force. In recent years Sweden has taken the place of the US and 
Germany as the main supplier of Norway’s Army.
5. SWEDEN
5.1. Defence policy
The strategic context of Sweden’s defence policy is defined mainly by 
the threats and challenges to regional security, especially in the Baltic 
Sea region. In addition to this, Sweden seeks to strengthen its own inter-
national position by actively participating in international security policy. 
After the Russian-Georgian war (2008), Sweden reverted partly to treating 
regional security as a priority. Earlier, it had focused on indirect threats and 
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global challenges, and had no sense of a threat to the military security of the 
state and the region. This attitude contributed to the cuts in defence spend-
ing and the downsizing of military capabilities, and to a reorientation of the 
Armed Forces in 2004, from a defensive force model towards the model of 
an expeditionary force; those plans were then partially reviewed in 2009. In 
Sweden’s view, the geopolitics of its neighbourhood has been changing – this 
view refers to the Baltic Sea region (due to the transport of energy resources 
having been stepped up), and the Barents Sea and the Arctic (due to the ex-
traction and transport of energy resources, more intensive maritime trans-
port and fishing), and also to the rise of Russia’s global power ambitions and 
the lowering of the threshold of the use of force in its immediate neighbour-
hood. Sweden does not rule out the possibility that crises may occur in the 
region, in which military measures may be employed. A direct attack against 
Sweden or one of the other countries of the region is regarded as unlikely, but 
not altogether impossible.
Sweden’s defence policy have been undergoing extensive changes since the 
end of the Cold War. In the late 1990s Sweden abandoned its policy of neutral-
ity dating back to 1812 in favour of non-alignment. The reasons for this included 
the end of the Cold War, Sweden’s changed geopolitical position, and the fact 
that most countries in the region had become EU and NATO members. The re-
cent challenges and threats have prompted further changes in Sweden’s policy 
and the adoption, in 2009, of a “declaration of solidarity” in which Sweden uni-
laterally pledged not to stay passive in the event of a “catastrophe or military 
attack” against EU or Nordic states (and expressed an expectation of a similar 
commitment from those states). It also pledged that its Armed Forces would de-
velop capabilities to provide and receive military assistance. However, Sweden 
maintains that the declaration does not create commitments equivalent to those 
under Article 5, and continues to emphasise its non-aligned status. 
Sweden has been actively involved in EU security policy since the end of the 
1990s. It has advocated a strong EU presence in the international arena, ar-
guing that the EU should pursue a policy focused on crisis management (and 
strengthen its civilian component), but not of collective defence. This led to 
a relative decline in the importance of the United Nations as the main frame-
work for Sweden’s foreign and security policy and its involvement in crisis 
management operations after the end of the Cold War. Sweden regards its 
involvement in EU operations as a way of strengthening its international po-
sition. In the EU, it advocates: the use of the EU Battle Groups (it is a frame-
work nation of the Nordic Battle Group which is on standby every four years); 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
42
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
12
/2
01
2
better civil-military co-operation; and the creation of an EU market for arms 
products. Furthermore, it has co-authored the pooling & sharing initiative 
with Germany. Presently, however, Sweden is disappointed that the instru-
ments which are available in the EU are not being used and that there has 
been no progress within the CSDP. For this reason, the country seems to be 
advocating the development of “soft instruments”, i.e. a reform of the EU de-
velopment policy or the creation of a European Peace Institute to mediate in 
conflicts. 
NATO’s involvement in crisis management operations after the end of the 
Cold War has also contributed to Sweden stepping up co-operation with 
NATO. The country has participated in Partnership for Peace since 1994 and, 
through this, it has also been involved in PARP, OCC, exercises and train-
ing, civilian crisis planning, and NATO operations. Sweden’s objective is to 
achieve interoperability with NATO and to alleviate the technical obstacles 
that impede its participation in multinational operations, to adjust its Armed 
Forces reform to NATO standards, to gain a platform for political dialogue 
and co-operation, and to strengthen its international position. The Baltic Sea 
region is increasingly the main point of reference for Sweden’s co-operation 
with NATO. The Swedish government is aware that NATO will not be able 
to support the Baltic states without using Sweden’s airspace, its waters and 
even its land territory. Enabling NATO operations, co-ordinating actions or 
even subordinating the Swedish Armed Forces to NATO command struc-
tures might be a military and political necessity. Moreover, at least until the 
completion of the current reform, the Swedish military will not be able to 
independently safeguard the country’s territorial security and Stockholm is 
counting on NATO’s support in defending Swedish territory. Hence the “dec-
laration of solidarity” and Sweden’s active involvement in PfP and NATO ex-
ercises in the region (including Loyal Arrow 2009 in Sweden, NRF Brilliant 
Mariner 2010, BRTE 2011 and 2012 in the Baltic states, and CMX 2011 in Nor-
way). The aim of these has been to develop co-operation with the armed forces 
of NATO states in the region and with NATO’s command structures. Sweden 
will also take part in future NATO operations that will offer an opportunity 
for the Swedish Armed Forces to gain operational experience in co-operat-
ing with NATO allies. The question of accession to NATO remains in Sweden 
a political taboo; the Swedes still hold the conviction that non-alignment is 
the best insurance policy and that membership would entail excessive finan-
cial and political commitments. It is in Sweden’s interest to develop more ex-
tensive bilateral and transatlantic relations with the USA and to keep the US 
present in the Baltic Sea region. The political elite of Sweden is aware of this, 
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even if it is reluctant to emphasise this publicly. Swedish public opinion still 
harbours a negative attitude, dating back to the Cold War, towards the USA’s 
global actions, an attitude that became even more pronounced after the US 
intervention in Iraq. 
Co-operation in the Baltic Sea region is, according to Sweden, conducive to 
strengthening security in the region. The priority is on sea (the SUCBAS 
programme) and air surveillance (by signing an agreement with Norway, 
Sweden has joined NATO’s ASDE system), as well as closer co-operation be-
tween border guards and customs services in the region. The Nordic Defence 
Co-operation offers the centre-right government an opportunity to co-operate 
more broadly with its NATO partners (Denmark and Norway) while accession 
to NATO, or even stepped up co-operation, remain domestically highly con-
troversial. The aim of co-operation within NORDEFCO is to maintain existing 
capabilities or to develop new ones at a time when defence spending is con-
tracting, and to create a Nordic equivalent of smart defence.
5.2. Armed forces and the arms industry
The Swedish Armed Forces (21,000 troops during peacetime and 41,000 
in wartime) possess a high potential and are considered to be a genuine 
guarantor of the state’s security. They include an operational component 
(the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, as well as Special Forces), and the for-
mally separate volunteer Home Guard. The forces are very well trained and 
equipped, with well-developed special forces units, and all the service branch-
es possess relatively high potentials and capabilities. Military spending has 
oscillated around 1.3% of GDP in recent years, corresponding to approximately 
US$ 6 billion. A quarter of this budget is earmarked for investments. In 2009 
Sweden decided to abolish universal conscription as of 1 July 2010 (currently 
military service is voluntary) and to implement a large-scale reform to reor-
ganise the Armed Forces (by 2014), to make its operational component fully 
professional (by 2018), and also to optimise costs in the short term. The priority 
of the Swedish Armed Forces is to ensure they have capabilities to carry out op-
erations not only in Sweden, but also elsewhere in the region and on missions 
in other parts of the world. Another important objective of the reform is to en-
hance the ability of the Armed Forces to co-operate with NATO forces by fully 
implementing NATO standards. The purpose of the reform is to enable Sweden 
to reduce its armament and military equipment at the same time as it upgrades 
the remaining one in compliance with NATO standards. The possibilities of 
deploying the Armed Forces are to be considerably extended. 
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The Air Force as a whole maintains the highest level of combat readiness. At its 
core are three fighter wings (the Swedish Air Force’s strike capability exceeds 
the strike capability of all the other Nordic forces combined). The Air Force 
is currently being restructured – ultimately, i.e. by 2014, its core will consist 
of four fighter squadrons (equipped with 100 JAS 39C/D fighter aircraft), one 
transport squadron (C-130E/H) and one helicopter battalion (made up of two 
squadrons: land support and sea support). Sweden has an extensive network of 
airfields – most of its 147 airfields may be used as bases for fighter aircraft. The 
armament and military equipment of the Air Force are consistently upgraded. 
In 2015–2020, the JAS 39 C/D fighter aircraft are going to be upgraded to E/F 
standard (as a result of which they will acquire the capability of mid-air refu-
elling, which only some aircraft have now), and new fighter aircraft in the E/F 
standard (40-60) are to be acquired. The Navy consists of two components: the 
combat fleet and amphibious units. Its strike capability is significant (5 subma-
rines, 9 missile corvettes, including two Visby class stealth corvettes), as well 
as a smaller minesweeping force (6 vessels) and a patrolling force. The Navy’s 
potential is being steadily upgraded – three new Visby class missile corvettes 
are in the testing phase, and the construction of new-generation submarines is 
to start this year. The Army, the largest branch in the Armed Forces, is in the 
initial phase of restructuring. It is expected to achieve operational readiness 
in the new structure in 2014. After the reform, the Army will be able to de-
ploy seven battle groups. A battle group will consist of: a manoeuvre battalion 
(the core of the battle group) and combat support units (artillery, engineering 
or air defence units depending on the needs) as well as service support units. 
The Army possesses large quantities of heavy armament and military equip-
ment, the great majority of which are state-of-the-art and relatively uniform. 
Its basic armaments include Leopard 2A5 tanks, CV90 infantry fighting vehi-
cles, as well as Patria AMV wheeled armoured personnel carriers (in service 
since 2010) and 155 mm Archer artillery system (in service since 2011). It is no-
table that there are a high number of caterpillar armoured personnel carriers 
suitable for operations in polar conditions. One of the objectives of the cur-
rent reform is to increase the importance of the Home Guard, i.e. the lighter 
component of the Swedish Armed Forces. The Home Guard will receive more 
technologically advanced armament and military equipment, and will be bet-
ter trained. The Swedish Armed Forces also include the Special Forces formed 
in 2011, which have a special operations battalion at their core.
The Swedish Armed Forces possess a relatively good capability to indepen-
dently defend the country’s territory and safeguard Sweden’s interests in the 
Baltic Sea. The well-developed and relatively well equipped Home Guard, on 
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the other hand, offers extensive possibilities to carry out irregular actions 
(including guerrilla warfare in areas taken by a potential enemy). The Swed-
ish Armed Forces are also relatively well prepared to take part in operations 
abroad, including the ability to deploy an independent contingent (complete 
with logistic facilities) of any kind of service branch. 
Sweden has a developed arms industry which largely provides for the 
needs of the Swedish Armed Forces in almost all possible areas. The Swed-
ish arms industry is one of the strongest and most technologically advanced 
in the world. Due to the links that some Swedish companies have with arms 
producers in the US and Britain, i.e. the dominant players in the arms market, 
and with some Finnish, Norwegian and German companies, the Swedish arms 
industry has access to the newest technologies. The most important products 
of the Swedish arms industry include: armoured vehicles and artillery (BAE 
Hagglunds, BAE Bofors), combat aircraft (Saab), warships (Kockums), ammu-
nition (Akers Krutbruk, BAE Hagglunds, Nammo Sweden, Norma) and guided 
missiles (BAE Bofors), ballistic protection systems (Akers Krutbruk, Bofors, 
CSM Materialteknik, Saab Barracuda), electronics and radio-electronics 
(Ericsson, Saab), optoelectronics (Aimpoint, Flir), and simulators and training 
aids (NSC, Saab). The Swedish arms industry is one of the leaders in new tech-
nologies (STEALTH, composite armours, Stirling engines), and co-operates in 
the development of new generations of armament (Saab created the hull for 
the prototype of Neuron, the European unmanned combat air vehicle). Finally, 
while the Swedish arms industry does not produce helicopters or transport 
aircraft, it does have the capacity to upgrade and service them.
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II. THE BALTIC STATES
1. NORDIC-BALTIC CO-OPERATION
In the 1990s the Nordic and the Baltic states started co-operating in various bi-
lateral formats as soon as Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia gained independence. 
The Nordic states would transfer used armament and military equipment to 
their Baltic partners, send instructors and advisors to assist them in the estab-
lishment of their armed forces, and later on, in the development of standards 
and infrastructure necessary for the Baltic states’ membership in NATO. Den-
mark in particular was actively involved in this co-operation and supported 
the accession of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to NATO. Denmark could do so 
because, following German reunification, it was less geographically exposed 
to Russia, and its involvement in the region was already part of the effort to 
strengthen the alliance with the United States and position itself as the USA’s 
best European ally. The prime objective for all the Nordic states was to facili-
tate the accession of the Baltic states to NATO (and the EU), and in doing so to 
enhance the security of the south-eastern part of the Baltic Sea region. 
After the Baltic states joined NATO in 2004, the intensity of co-operation 
declined and its character changed. For the Nordic states, NATO was from then 
on in charge of the security of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Nevertheless, in 
order to make use of the experience they had gained from establishing and 
transforming the Baltic security sectors, the countries in question launched 
Nordic-Baltic initiatives to support security sector reforms in Ukraine and 
the Western Balkans. In addition, individual Baltic states started to co-op-
erate with the Nordic states on NATO operations (with Denmark in the Bal-
kans and Iraq, and with Norway in Afghanistan), within the EUBG and NRF, 
or by affiliating their military units to the armed forces’ units of the Nordic 
partners (mainly Denmark). Nevertheless, military co-operation was taking 
place on the margins of the broader Nordic-Baltic 8 (NB8) co-operation for-
mat under which the partners were co-operating in the areas of the economy 
(the Nordic states are currently among the most important investors and trad-
ing partners of the Baltic states), the financial sector, energy, environmental 
protection, culture and education. Since 2010, the Nordic and the Baltic states 
have been gradually developing closer foreign policy relations in a process 
triggered by the so-called “NB8 Wise Men Report”. This is happening without 
separate co-operation structures being created, through stepped-up multilat-
eral intergovernmental and inter-ministerial consultations and measures to 
co-ordinate and agree on joint positions (usually concerning developments in 
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distant regions of the world, such as the civil war in Syria). Such co-operation 
strengthens the position of the Nordic and Baltic states and boosts the region’s 
visibility in international politics and as regards the United States. In order 
to further strengthen co-operation with the USA, the Nordic and Baltic states 
have also been seeking to use the e-PINE format of the US Department of State, 
which has been in place for several years and which provides a framework for 
dialogue on cooperative security, healthy societies and economies. 
In the years since NORDEFCO was established, the Baltic states have shown 
an interest in broader co-operation within this organisation. From their point 
of view, such co-operation would strengthen military links with the Nordic 
states, and closer regional integration (though not undermining NATO’s role) 
would indirectly provide additional security guarantees for the Baltic states 
and expand their room for manoeuvre in foreign policy. Owing to tensions in 
bilateral relations with Poland, until recently regarded as one of Lithuania’s pri-
ority partners for military co-operation, Vilnius in particular has been seeking 
closer co-operation with the Nordic states in recent years, viewing the north-
ern vector of its security and defence policy as a counterpoise, if not a substi-
tute, for co-operation with Poland. This has been visible not only in Lithuania’s 
activity within the NB8, but also in its ambition to participate in the Nordic Bat-
tle Group (NBG) and its support for the potential participation of Sweden and 
Finland in Baltic Air Policing. However, the Nordic states have been wary about 
developing closer military links with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Officially, 
they want to see the results of co-operation in the smaller (Nordic) format first. 
The real reason is, however, their conviction that efforts to strengthen Nordic-
Baltic military relations could be seen by Moscow as attempts at creating ad-
ditional regional alliances against Russia. NATO could interpret these efforts as 
meaning that the Nordic members of NATO are assuming greater responsibil-
ity for the security of the Baltic states, and that Finland and Sweden are com-
mitting themselves to assisting the Baltic states militarily. In this context, the 
involvement of Sweden (in 2011 and 2012) and Finland (in 2012) in NATO’s BRTE 
exercise (aimed at improving air policing over the Baltic states) should be seen 
as a way of increasing the interoperability of the Swedish and Finnish air forces 
with NATO member states in the region, and not as preparation to join the Bal-
tic Air Policing mission. There is no political consent in Sweden and Finland for 
participation in NATO actions that directly refer to Article 5. 
Nevertheless, over the last year the Nordic states have decided to extend se-
curity and defence co-operation with the Baltic states on specific projects, 
and this can be considered as a breakthrough of sorts. Since 2012, the chiefs of 
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defence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have been able to take part in selected 
meetings of the NORDEFCO Military Co-ordination Committee and military 
representatives from the Baltic states may observe the proceedings of some 
working groups within the organisation. Still, the Nordic states prefer to limit 
institutionalised co-operation with the Baltic states to joint actions outside the 
region, i.e. operations abroad (both civilian and military) and activities related 
to capacity building and security sector reforms in developing countries, or 
“soft security” (cyber and energy security) issues and the use of Lithuania’s and 
Estonia’s know-how in those fields, developed within the NATO framework. By 
co-operating with the Baltic states, the Nordic states are seeking to strengthen 
their international position and the visibility of the Nordic-Baltic region, also 
in international security policy. Co-operation with Lithuania, Latvia and Esto-
nia, especially in bilateral formats, is also considered in economic terms. The 
Nordic states expect to benefit from the likely increase in defence spending by 
Lithuania and Latvia, and the unchanged defence budget of Estonia. The Baltic 
states have hardly any arms industries, and their armed forces depend fully 
on external supplies of armament and military equipment. It is therefore pos-
sible that the joint acquisitions of armament and military equipment with the 
Baltic states, proposed by the Nordic partners, will lead to some more bilateral 
or trilateral co-operation on training and exercises, i.e. the areas in which the 
Nordic states may offer additional co-operation opportunities. 
2. BALTIC CO-OPERATION
Defence co-operation between Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia after 1990 
was stimulated by external factors. In the early 1990s the involvement of the 
Nordic states in the region provided the stimulus for Baltic co-operation in 
some areas. Later, closer co-operation became part of these countries’ efforts 
to become members of NATO, since NATO regarded the Baltic states as a single 
entity. More recently, the Russian-Georgian war contributed to more inten-
sive Baltic co-operation. The lasting legacy of earlier initiatives includes the 
joint mine countermeasures squadron BALTRON, which today is part of the 
Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCMG1), the BALTNET 
air surveillance and control system, which is part of NATO’s NATINADS, and 
the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) in Tartu, Estonia. After accession to 
NATO, co-operation between the Baltic states lost some of its momentum and 
continued only through the initiatives that were already in place at that time. 
Co-operation at the political level became more intensive only after the Rus-
sian-Georgian war in 2008, when the Baltic states stepped up joint efforts to 
obtain the contingency plans, a greater US and NATO military presence in the 
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region (through exercises), favourable provisions on collective defence in NA-
TO’s new Strategic Concept, and an extension of the Baltic Air Policing mission. 
At the military level, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia jointly formed the Baltic 
Battalion which became part of the land component of NRF-14 in 2010 (Latvia 
withdrew from this project for financial reasons, leaving only a small number 
of staff personnel) and stepped up their joint Host Nation Support exercises. In 
recent years there have also been some cases of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
co-operating on foreign operations (Kosovo) or jointly purchasing armament 
and military equipment. 
Over the years, the obstacles encountered in co-operation between the 
Baltic states have been of a political, military and domestic/structural nature. 
At the political level, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have been more interested 
in developing co-operation with their larger neighbours than in regional inte-
gration (Estonia with Finland, Lithuania with Poland), because of geographical 
proximity considerations or political and economic priorities. At the military 
level, co-operation was hindered by the fact that the three countries possess 
and buy disparate types of equipment, have low interoperability and no basis 
to seek joint savings. All these factors are lingering consequences of the fact 
that back in the 1990s they developed their respective armed forces in co-op-
eration with different partners (the USA, the UK, the Nordic states). Problems 
in managing the armed forces were also significant at the domestic level and 
this hampered the implementation of trilateral projects and left the partners 
frustrated with co-operation. In addition, the armed forces of the Baltic states 
had different priorities with regard to the development of their armed forces. 
Moreover, the Baltic states share similar concerns: about Russia’s policy in its 
European neighbourhood; they have a common interest in maintaining trans-
atlantic links; and agree on many defence policy issues. However, their na-
tional interests and priorities vary and there is often no “Baltic unity” at the 
political level. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are in competition for transit ac-
tivity in their territories, Latvia and Estonia have refused to back Lithuania’s 
efforts to block negotiations of the new EU-Russia agreement; and Lithuania 
and Estonia were rather slow in expressing political support for Estonia in the 
aftermath of the 2007 cyber attacks. 
In future, the Baltic states should be expected: to continue co-operating po-
litically within NATO; to work together politically and militarily on exercises 
organised in the region by themselves or within the NATO and Partnership 
for Freedom framework; to jointly support the development of Centres of Ex-
cellence in Estonia and Lithuania; to make regular joint contributions to NRF 
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(every four years according to plans); to jointly develop the BALTDEFCOL and 
possible new initiatives aimed at increasing the effectiveness and level of spe-
cialisation of training; and finally, to co-operate with respect to Host Nation 
Support. Limited joint purchases of armament and military equipment are 
also possible (such as the joint purchase of ammunition for the Carl Gustav 
antitank recoilless rifle, agreed upon in 2012). All three Baltic states are also 
interested in – and could co-operate on – preventing internal information cam-
paigns that negatively affect the their image in the EU and NATO and which 
could result in NATO decreasing its presence in the region or which could dis-
credit the Baltic states. 
3. LITHUANIA, LATVIA AND ESTONIA
3.1. Defence policies
Despite having normalised their relations with Russia, the Baltic states still 
believe that Moscow’s objective is to rebuild its political and economic influ-
ence in the former Baltic republics. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have been 
through numerous political and economic affairs (including the cyber attacks 
and riots over the Bronze Soldier monument in Estonia, and strikes and pro-
tests of the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia) that were related to the ac-
tivities of pro-Russian forces, Russian-backed businesses or the Russian secret 
services in the Baltic states. Russia’s sustained aggressive anti-Baltic rhetoric 
has further strengthened the perception held by the societies and political 
elites in the Baltic states that their political, social and economic stability is 
under threat. The war in Georgia, followed by Russia’s “Medvedev doctrine” on 
the protection of Russian citizens, its interests and sphere of influence (con-
strued as the CIS area) abroad and the Zapad and Ladoga military exercises 
(also involving Belarus) have also given rise to fears about the territorial integ-
rity of the Baltic states.
Lithuania believes that the likelihood of a direct military confrontation is low, 
but it does not rule out the possibility that military force might be used in the 
future, given Russia’s growing military potential and the country flexing its 
muscles in the region. However, Vilnius believes that the most serious threat to 
Lithuania’s broadly understood security lies its energy and economic depend-
ence on third countries (which implies Russia). The Lithuanian leadership still 
fears possible Russian pressure on the Lithuanian political system, the coun-
try’s social and economic life and national identity. It is concerned about pos-
sible attempts at discrediting the state internationally – and Lithuania’s fears 
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in this respect may refer not only to Russia, but recently also to Poland. Finally, 
Lithuania does not rule out the possibility of terror attacks. 
Latvia officially applies a broad definition of threats to its security and believes 
that the likelihood of a direct military confrontation in its territory is relative-
ly low. It does not rule out the possibility of such a confrontation, though, giv-
en Russia’s rising military potential and Moscow’s ambition to strengthen its 
position in international politics. According to the Latvian leadership, future 
threats may be difficult to predict and may consist in a combination of an at-
tack or pressure using conventional means and non-standard actions (terror-
ism, organised crime, cyber attacks, informational and psychological warfare, 
instigation of social and ethnic tension). Of the three Baltic states, Latvia ap-
pears to be the “weakest link” in terms of security. It has the smallest military 
and the lowest defence spending (a tendency that has been exacerbated by the 
economic crisis). It also has the largest Russian-speaking minority among all 
the Baltic states (35%).
In Estonia, a direct military challenge to the country’s territorial integrity 
now or in the future is regarded as being an unlikely possibility. However, Es-
tonia does not rule it out in the longer term, taking into consideration Russia’s 
rising military potential and its increasingly assertive policies. The Estonian 
leadership believes that it may become a target of external pressure aimed at 
discrediting the Estonian government and/or forcing it to take foreign and se-
curity policy or economic decisions that will run counter to Estonia’s interests. 
Pressure involving military means may be combined with the use of economic 
instruments, cyber attacks or attempts at causing internal destabilisation. Ac-
cording to Estonian politicians, asymmetric regional development and ethnic 
divisions within Estonian society may potentially undermine the country’s co-
hesion, as demonstrated by the riots over the Bronze Soldier monument.
The Baltic states consider the presence of the United States in the region to be 
key and highly important for the regional balance of power. In their view, only 
the US currently has the means and the political will to act in the event of a po-
litical crisis/conflict with Russia in the region. The Baltic states are therefore 
seeking for the US presence in the region to be stepped up and want to develop 
close military relations. They are also looking for their “specialisations” and 
global security topics on which they could co-operate with the United States. 
For them, the US presence in the region does not appear to be diminishing but, 
on the contrary, has slightly increased in recent years with the internation-
al military exercises conducted by the US (Sabre Strike), US participation in 
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exercises organised by the Baltic states (Baltic Host, Amber Hope) and exercis-
es within NATO and Partnership for Peace frameworks. Military co-operation 
between the Baltic states and the US includes armed forces training (e.g. JTAC) 
as well as material and financial assistance. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
have been trying to identify their “assets” and domains in which they could co-
operate more closely with the United States. Latvia specialises in expanding 
its potential as a transit country and co-operates with the USA on the use of the 
Northern Distribution Network (NDN). It should be noted that the other Baltic 
states are also active in this area. Latvia has been trying to get involved in the 
co-ordination of transport with Russia and the Central Asian states; and has 
pledged to work more actively on the update of the EU Strategy for Central Asia. 
Estonia has been emphasising its expertise in cyber security issues as its spe-
ciality within NATO and an asset in relations with the United States (through 
the activities and promotion of the Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CoE) in 
Tallinn). Lithuania has been making efforts to obtain NATO accreditation and 
CoE status for the Energy Security Centre established in Vilnius.
The Baltic states treat membership in NATO and Article 5 as the foundations of 
their security. Commitments to the collective defence of the Baltic states under 
Article 5 have been strengthened by the 2010 annex to the contingency plans for 
Poland (Eagle Guardian), but the question of the staff and field exercises needed 
to enable the implementation of those plans remains open. The priorities for the 
Baltic states currently include: (1) continuation of the Baltic Air Policing mission; 
in this regard, the decision of the Chicago NATO summit to extend the opera-
tion on the condition that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia increase their financial 
contributions can be considered a success; (2) increasing NATO visibility in the 
region through NATO and PfP exercises involving allied forces; (3) investments 
in military and civil infrastructures (development of airfields and ports) with 
a view to enhancing the ability of the Baltic States to accept allied military and 
civil assistance (Host Nation Support/HNS), as well as the participation of allies 
in the Baltic states exercises related to HNS (Baltic Host, Amber Hope); (4) the 
presence and activities of broadly understood NATO infrastructures i.e. Cen-
tres of Excellence that have the status of international military organisations 
(in Estonia and, in future, in Lithuania); (5) strengthening the NATO partner-
ships policy in view of the development of military relations between the Baltic 
states and Sweden and Finland; (6) strengthening the position of the Baltic states 
within the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). While the Baltic states benefit 
economically from the NDN, they treat the movement of US cargo – and that of 
other allies – via their territories, sea ports and airports as an additional secu-
rity-enhancing factor, since the NDN positions them as important partners for 
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the USA (at least until 2014), especially considering the closed transport route via 
Pakistan. However, for political and economic reasons, participation in the NDN 
is also an area where the Baltic states, and especially Lithuania and Latvia, are 
in competition with each other. Involvement in foreign operations is seen in the 
Baltic states as their contribution to collective defence within NATO and a way to 
maintain good relations with the United States. 
The Baltic states were initially sceptical about the development of the EU secu-
rity policy and treated the CSDP as a rival project for NATO, however, in recent 
years they have started to perceive the CSDP instruments (EUBG, joint acquisi-
tions, research co-operation under EDA, joint operations, development of civil-
military capabilities) as conducive to integration and co-operation within the 
EU, and as enhancing cohesion among the member states. Participation in the 
EU Battle Groups in particular is seen in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as an 
opportunity to step up co-operation with priority partners. However, the three 
countries believe that the development prospects of the CSDP are dependent 
on the largest members of the EU. 
3.2. Armed forces and the arms industries
The Lithuanian Armed Forces are small (8,500 troops; 15,700 including the 
home guard) and are treated as an instrument of state policy. Since their 
professionalisation in 2008, there most probably are no plans for expansion 
through mobilisation during wartime. The Lithuanian military includes the 
regular armed forces (the Land Forces, the Air Force, the Navy and the Special 
Forces, which operate as an independent service branch) as well as volunteer 
home guard (National Defence Volunteer Forces). Its units are poorly equipped 
(even accounting for size), but relatively well-trained. Military spending has 
been systematically falling back in recent years, from 1.2% of GDP in 2007 to 
0.8% of GDP (US$ 350 million) in 2011. 85% of the military budget is spent on 
current activities. In 2012 Lithuania committed itself to gradually increasing 
the military budget, with a view to achieving a level of 2% of GDP. In 2010, the 
Lithuanian Armed Forces completed the reforms aimed at adaptation to NATO 
standards. The changes planned and implemented in recent years have been 
scattered and limited to technological upgrades designed to enhance defence 
capabilities (airspace surveillance and coastal water patrolling) and Lithu-
ania’s ability to take part in multinational foreign missions. 
The Land Forces are the main service branch, with the well-developed “Iron 
Wolf” infantry brigade at its core. It possesses a limited quantity of heavy 
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armament and military equipment. The only significant items of equipment 
include older types of armoured personnel carriers, 105 mm howitzers and 120 
mm mortars. Technological upgrade plans are in place mainly for the “Iron 
Wolf” brigade which is being prepared to take part in foreign operations and 
its equipment is being gradually modernised. In operational terms, the Nation-
al Defence Volunteer Forces are an integral part of the Army. The Air Force’s 
main task is to provide logistic support for the operations of the Land Forces 
and the Special Forces (a squadron of transport aircraft and helicopters); and 
its capability to train pilots of combat aircraft or to carry out combat operations 
against targets on land or at sea is merely symbolic. The Air Force includes an 
air defence battalion whose armaments allow it to counter low-flying targets. 
The Air Force modernisation plans are focused mainly on the combat service 
support component (e.g. the purchase of new helicopters and an upgrade to the 
radar station are under consideration). The Navy has limited patrolling and 
mine countermeasures capabilities. At its core are a mine countermeasures 
squadron and a patrol boat squadron. In future, the MCM squadron is expected 
to adapt to co-operate within NATO. The Special Forces have been established 
as a separate service branch mainly in view of Lithuania’s ambition to mark 
its presence on foreign operations. It has been deployed in NATO operations 
(including in Afghanistan). 
The Lithuanian Armed Forces have no capability to independently engage in 
regular defence of country’s territory, and remain fully dependent on allied 
support in this respect. However, the potential of the regular forces and the 
volunteer formations enables them to carry out non-regular operations (in-
cluding guerrilla warfare in areas occupied by the enemy). The Lithuanian 
military’s capability to be deployed on missions abroad is limited. The Lithu-
anian Armed Forces can only participate as part of contingents of other coun-
tries.
Lithuania has no arms industry except for two electronics companies that 
provide services to the military (Elsis, Euroelektronika). The country’s civil 
material and technological resources enable the armed forces to carry out ba-
sic inspections and small overhauls of some types of equipment. The Lithu-
anian Armed Forces are fully dependent on external supplies of armament and 
military equipment. 
The Latvian Armed Forces have a very small potential (5,000 troops in 
peacetime with the capacity to expand to 50,000 during wartime), and 
are treated as an instrument of state policy. They include the regular armed 
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forces (the Land Forces, the Air Force and the Navy) and voluntary home guard 
(the National Guard, which in operational terms is part of the Land Force). The 
Latvian Armed Forces were professionalised in 2007. It is poorly equipped but 
relatively well-trained. Military spending has decreased in recent years from 
1.5% of GDP in 2007 to 1.0% of GDP (US$ 290 million) in 2011. 80% of the mili-
tary budget is spent on current activities. The new National Defence Concept 
adopted by the Latvian parliament in May 2012 includes a provision that the 
military budget should be gradually increased to reach a level of 2% of GDP 
by 2020. Under the Armed Forces’ multiannual development plan to 2020, the 
objective is to complete adaptations to NATO standards and preparations for 
participation in international operations as part of multinational forces. As re-
gards measures directly related to defence of the country’s territory, Latvia is 
developing its radar protection system, mainly, however, in the maritime area. 
The Land Forces are the largest service branch of the Latvian military. At its 
core is an infantry brigade which is serving as the foundation for the forma-
tion of a mechanised brigade, earmarked for deployment within multination-
al forces (the brigade is expected to gain operational readiness in 2017). The 
Land Forces have hardly any heavy armament (and no plans to acquire any) or 
military equipment (barely a dozen armoured personnel carriers and a lim-
ited number of 120 mm mortars). The Land Forces are primarily equipped with 
low-calibre weapons and portable weapons. The Navy has a relatively high ca-
pability to patrol coastal waters, and a limited mine countermeasure capabil-
ity. Its main equipment includes patrol boats (new vessels are being put into 
service) and mine warfare vessels. The Air Force does not have a combat com-
ponent. Its only squadron has no fighter aircraft or helicopters capable of per-
forming combat tasks. The air defence squadron can only counter low-flying 
targets. No development of the Air Force is envisaged in the military’s modern-
isation plans. The Latvian Armed Forces have no capabilities to independently 
engage in regular defence of country’s territory, and remain fully dependent 
on allied support in this respect. However, the potential of the regular forces 
and the volunteer formations enables them to carry out non-regular opera-
tions (including guerrilla warfare in areas occupied by the enemy), provided 
they receive weapons supplies from outside. The Latvian Armed Forces have 
a limited ability to take part in operations abroad (they can do so only within 
the contingents of other states).
Latvia has no arms industry apart from the shipbuilding sector – the Riga 
Shipyard builds new patrol boats for the Navy. The country’s civil material and 
technological resources enable the armed forces to carry out basic inspections 
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and small overhauls of some types of equipment. Otherwise the Latvian Armed 
Forces are fully dependent on external supplies of armament and military 
equipment. 
The Estonian Armed Forces have a very small potential (5,000 soldiers 
during peacetime, with a relatively high mobilisation capacity dur-
ing wartime – 30,000 regular troops, or 150,000 including the volunteer 
home guard), and are treated as a guarantor of the state’s security. They 
include the regular forces (cadre in peacetime), i.e. the Land Forces, the Air 
Force and the Navy, as well as the volunteer home guard (the Defence League). 
The Armed Forces are poorly equipped but relatively well-trained (the regular 
forces and the Defence League units train systematically). Military spending 
has oscillated around 1.8% of GDP in recent years; in 2011 the military budget 
amounted to US$ 390 million. 25% of this budget is earmarked for investments. 
The Armed Forces development plan provides for comprehensive changes in 
its structure and equipment. The priority is to enhance capabilities to defend 
country’s territory based on Estonia’s own potential and on allied support, i.e. 
to develop the military infrastructures necessary for receiving and supporting 
the operations of allied forces (Host Nation Support), and – in the area of tech-
nological upgrades – to increase the combat capabilities of air defence. 
The Land Forces are the largest service branch of the Estonian military, with 
an infantry brigade constituting its core during peacetime (during wartime, 
four brigades are supposed to be deployed). It possesses older types of heavy ar-
mament (Pasi/Sisu XA-180/188 armoured personnel carriers received from the 
Finnish Armed Forces and towed artillery donated by Finland and Sweden) in 
limited quantities which are nonetheless sufficient to equip a brigade and ar-
tillery units. Plans are in place to equip units with newer types of equipment, 
including anti-aircraft missile launchers and light Eurocopter EC-135 helicop-
ters, as well as new tanks and new types of anti-tank weapons. The Air Force 
is currently being formed and is not a significant formation. Its only mixed 
squadron serves solely as a transport unit catering to the needs of the Land 
Forces. Estonia has no air defence measures, and the Amari air base is its only 
major military facility. By 2014, the first short-range air defence missile squad-
ron is to be formed and radar stations are to become operational. The Navy 
possesses limited mine countermeasure capabilities. No Navy development 
plans are in place. The priority is to modernise the Tallinn and Paldiski marine 
bases with a view to potentially receiving allied forces there. The Armed Forces 
have a limited capability to independently defend the country’s territory. With 
respect to air and maritime operations, they remain fully dependent on allied 
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support. However, the well-developed mobilisation capacity and the volunteer 
formations offer Estonia relatively good capabilities to carry out irregular op-
erations (including guerrilla warfare in areas occupied by the enemy). The Es-
tonian Armed Forces have a limited ability to take part in operations abroad 
(they can do so only within the contingents of other states). 
Estonia has no arms industry. The country’s civil material and technologi-
cal resources enable the armed forces to carry out basic inspections and small 
overhauls of some types of equipment. The Estonian Armed Forces are fully 
dependent on external supplies of armament and military equipment. 
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III. THE VISEGRAD GROUP
1. VISEGRAD CO-OPERATION
1.1. History and the current status of co-operation
In the 1990s co-operation within the Visegrad Group (V4) was seen as 
a way of developing good neighbourly relations, but the primary objec-
tive was to buttress the process of the members’ integration with the EU 
and NATO. The shape and intensity of co-operation was determined by how 
useful the political elites of V4 considered the Group to be in foreign policy. 
The initial scepticism about closer defence co-operation was motivated in part 
by fears that NATO could view the development of V4 as an alternative to full 
membership. Besides this, the priority of the V4 members was on developing 
co-operation with their Western allies. Co-operation stalled in the mid 1990s 
largely because the then Czech government was generally ill-disposed towards 
the development of V4. Better prepared to NATO membership than the other 
partners, Prague thought that a politically strengthened V4 could potentially 
be a burden on its path towards the Euro-Atlantic structures. When the invita-
tion to join NATO was finally on the table, it provided an impulse for resuming 
co-operation. Another impulse came from the need to politically and militarily 
support Slovakia, which was lagging behind in terms of integration. V4 works, 
conducted within six working groups, served primarily to exchange informa-
tion and co-ordinate the process of NATO accession. After Slovakia caught up 
and joined NATO in 2004, one of the motivations to develop regional co-opera-
tion disappeared and in 2005 Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia disband-
ed the staff of their joint brigade, the formation of which had been intended as 
a means of supporting Slovakia’s accession. 
Thus, accession to NATO initially caused activity within V4 to subside. 
Developing closer relations with the Western allies was the priority, and di-
vergences of interests among the V4 members resurfaced. While it appeared 
that closer co-operation might be possible at least in the domain of military 
technology, i.e. that V4 could work together on upgrading Soviet-made mili-
tary equipment (such as the T-72 tanks), even in this area the divergences of 
interests proved difficult to overcome. The agreement to co-operate on the 
Mi-24 helicopters upgrade, concluded in 2002, was thought to be of major sig-
nificance. It provided for the upgrade of around one hundred helicopters in 
Poland. In 2003, however, the Czech Republic withdrew from the project. Its 
decision had been influenced by the stance adopted by Russia, which refused 
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to grant Poland the necessary licences and favoured bilateral talks with the 
individual V4 members. 
As far as acquisitions of new armament and military equipment are concerned, 
the V4 countries have been focused mainly on their domestic production and 
the products of Western European and US companies which could also provide 
offsets and technology transfers. The particular interests of individual states 
prevailed in practice, the failure of co-operation on the acquisition of new 
fighter aircraft being the prime example (Poland eventually purchased the 
F-16, Hungary and the Czech Republic leased the JAS 39 Gripen, while Slovakia 
kept its MiG aircraft and received 12 new MiG-29A/UB as part of its debt set-
tlement with Russia). A new opening in co-operation with regard to armament 
and military equipment became possible only in 2009 when the V4 established 
four working groups co-ordinated by its members: the group on the protection 
against weapons of mass destruction (co-ordinated by the Czech Republic); the 
“21st Century Soldier” project (co-ordinated by Poland); the group on air and 
missile defence modernisation (co-ordinated by Slovakia); and the group on 
strategic transport (co-ordinated by Hungary). Co-operation was intended to 
include to consultations, information exchange, a harmonisation of national 
rules and the creation of concept documents. However, the parties failed to im-
plement joint research projects, to carry out joint upgrades and acquisitions or 
to jointly use training centres. The output of the working groups was limited to 
consultations and declarations. The political will was lacking, partly because 
the partners had limited confidence in one another and were afraid to locate 
production capacity abroad. However, it was not so much strategic and defence 
considerations that were decisive, but rather social and political reasons: the 
partners wanted to avoid layoffs in the arms industry. 
Political co-operation in NATO, on the other hand, has been developing 
smoothly – the V4 states are all particularly interested in strengthening NATO’s 
defence capabilities and in transatlantic co-operation, as demonstrated by their 
declaration “Responsibility for a strong NATO”, adopted ahead of the NATO sum-
mit in Chicago in May 2012. During works on NATO’s new strategic concept that 
was adopted in 2010, all the V4 members worked together to make sure that the 
document emphasises NATO as a collective defence alliance, and also to call for 
updates of contingency plans and to promote the principle that seats of NATO 
institutions should be distributed evenly between the old and the new member 
states. The V4 states also sought to highlight the significance of NATO’s role as 
an important transatlantic forum for consultations on the territorial integrity, 
political sovereignty and security of its member states (Article 4), and argued 
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that the “open door policy” should continue. This does not mean, however, that 
the defence policies of the V4 countries were fully aligned. The differences in the 
perceptions of immediate threats within V4 are small enough for the members 
to act together as a regional group within NATO (usually with the Baltic states). 
They are, nevertheless, large enough for cohesion to be difficult to achieve in po-
litical and military initiatives that extend beyond the framework of NATO or the 
EU. For example, V4 has been split on the project to build elements of the US mis-
sile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Poland not only failed to persuade 
the other V4 partners to back those plans, it also failed to abate their objections 
to this project. Under leftist governments, Slovakia and Hungary expressed un-
derstanding for Russia’s reservations. While the talks with the United States 
on this project did result in more intensive relations between Poland and the 
Czech Republic and the two states kept each other informed about the ongoing 
negotiations, they did not co-ordinate their actions, despite declarations of their 
willingness to co-operate more closely. The respective attitudes the V4 countries 
have towards Russia have been different; they have all supported Ukraine’s and 
Georgia’s membership ambitions more (Poland and the Czech Republic) or less 
(Hungary) actively. Although the V4 governments had all acted in a similar man-
ner during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, their perceptions of it varied, es-
pecially with respect to the policy that NATO should adopt towards Russia in its 
aftermath (Poland and the Czech Republic took tougher stances). 
Military co-operation has seldom taken the form of closer co-operation 
among the V4 on NATO’s foreign operations (there have been no significant 
collaboration other than the Czech-Slovak battalions in the KFOR and OEF op-
erations, and the presence of Slovaks and Hungarians in the Polish sector in 
Iraq). Individual V4 members were more focused on developing co-operation 
with the “old” members of NATO. The Czechs operated in the British sectors in 
Bosnia, Kosovo and then Iraq, and a Czech brigade was deployed with the 1st 
British division within NATO’s ARRC corps, while the Hungarians co-operated 
with Italy. Nor was any closer co-operation established in Afghanistan be-
tween the V4 contingents, despite some attempts in that direction and despite 
the fact that they had complementary capacities. However, the requirements 
of the Afghanistan mission did trigger broader training and operational co-
operation among the states that possess the Mi helicopters. In 2009, the HIP 
Helicopter Task Force was launched, which involves V4 as well as Spain, Nor-
way, the UK and Albania, and is co-ordinated by the Czech Republic.
The armed forces of V4 states are also co-operating within NATO’s institu-
tions in Central Europe. V4 officers make up a substantial proportion of staff 
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at the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland, where the com-
mander is a Slovak, and the chief of staff is Czech, and the same applies to the 
command of the 3rd NATO Signal Battalion (3NSB) currently being created in 
Bydgoszcz. Czech and Slovak platoons are part of the Multinational Military 
Police Battalion (MNMPBAT, expected to be accredited in 2012). Regional part-
ners will certainly also be heavily involved in the Military Police Centre of Ex-
cellence, currently being established in Bydgoszcz (even though this is an area 
in which Romania also specialises). The Czechs want their regional partners to 
be involved in the creation of the MATC training centre for helicopter pilots. 
However, Poland and Hungary are the only V4 partners to participate in the 
SAC consortium that operates transport aircraft from a base in Hungary.
Co-operation within the EU. As new EU Member States, the V4 countries 
initially decided not to build a joint Battle Group. Slovakia joined the Polish- 
-German-Lithuanian-Latvian Battle Group, and the Czech Republic created 
a BG with Germany and Austria (later joined by Croatia, Macedonia – on duty 
in the second half of 2012), while Hungary created a BG with Italy and Slovenia. 
A Czech-Slovak Battle Group was also created (on duty in the second half of 
2009) but owing to the Slovak side’s tardiness and its inadequate delivery on 
commitments, this was not a positive experience.
In January 2007, the armed forces chiefs of staff meeting in Sliač, Slovakia, 
discussed the concept of a Visegrad Battle Group (also involving Ukraine). The 
partners pointed to the need to take into account complementariness between 
the NATO Response Force and EU actions. However, concept works dragged on 
between 2007 and 2011, the Hungarian part was making very slow progress on 
the feasibility study, and the V4 countries were not able to pledge the capacities 
crucial for the Battle Group’s functioning. In addition, Hungary was inclined to 
adopt a lower level of ambition for the V4BG than envisaged in the EU rules on 
Battle Groups. The project gained momentum only in May 2011 when the meeting 
of defence ministers in Levoča, Slovakia, restated their commitment to the crea-
tion of a V4BG that could begin its first duty in the first half of 2016. On the same 
occasion the partners said they expected Poland to take the role of the frame-
work state. Further progress was made during the Czech presidency in the V4 
(2011/2012). The Czechs put forward a proposal for closer V4 co-operation under 
the CSDP (with a view to the development of Battle Groups), backed the creation 
of a V4BG that would match the EU’s maximum level of ambition with a signifi-
cant contribution from the V4 states, and suggested that it could become a per-
manent structure whose logistic facilities could also be used in other initiatives. 
The capabilities pledged by the Czechs were probably decisive in overcoming the 
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impasse created by the fact that Slovakia and Hungary on their part did not con-
tribute adequate capabilities. Ultimately it was decided that Poland would deploy 
1,200 troops as the framework state, the Czech Republic – 800 troops, Slovakia 
– 400 troops and Hungary – 350 troops. The Czechs have pledged to contribute 
and manage a medical component and to provide MEDEVAC using a CASA air-
craft or STRATEVAC (where an Airbus 319 can be used to transport the wound-
ed), as well as a mine clearance company, an explosive ordnance disposal unit, 
a helicopter unit and logistic facilities complete with a Medium Cargo platoon 
and a Movement Control team. The Czech side has also expressed its readiness to 
deploy a combat unit in Pandur armoured vehicles. 
1.2. Attitudes towards co-operation
The rise of the pooling & sharing and smart defence concepts has prompted the 
V4 partners to start thinking about closer regional co-operation in the context of 
strengthening NATO and the CSDP. This does not mean, however, that motiva-
tions within the V4 are fully shared. While the catalogue of reasons raised by the 
political, ministerial or military circles in the states in question is in principle 
the same, there are variations in the role of different arguments and the distri-
bution of where stress is laid. The arguments that are raised refer to: concern 
about the efficacy of the NATO security umbrella in view of the United States’ 
waning interest in Europe (particularly important for the Czech Republic); 
NATO’s crisis highlighted by the intervention in Libya (which the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia and Hungary are concerned about); eroding confidence in the EU 
in view of the euro zone crisis (important for the Czechs and the Hungarians); 
the perceived rise of Russia’s power (demonstrated by the war in Georgia) and 
the growing sense of threat, exacerbated by historical experiences (mainly in 
the Czech Republic and Hungary); uncertainty about the direction of Germany’s 
policy and its rapprochement with Russia (sporadically raised by the Czechs and 
the Slovaks); the necessity of further budget cuts (important for Slovakia, Hun-
gary and the Czech Finance Ministry), or even closer co-operation as a useful 
political justification for more cuts (in Slovakia in particular); opportunities to 
consolidate the region and improve bilateral relations (noted by the Czech Re-
public, Slovakia and Hungary); and finally, opportunities to strengthen domes-
tic arms companies in view of the liberalisation of the EU defence market and 
technological progress (especially important for the Czech Republic). 
The Czech Republic is interested in developing deeper co-operation, including 
joint defence planning, which could lead to joint acquisitions and could gener-
ate savings. While the country regards the V4 as the primary regional format 
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for multilateral co-operation, in practice it prefers to develop bilateral projects 
which other countries may join if they are interested. The Czech Republic has 
significant expectations about developing co-operation with Poland, which 
Slovakia and Hungary could join (the Polish-Czech motor of V4), but co-opera-
tion with Austria, Croatia and Slovenia is also important for Prague. It was in 
this broader Central European format that the Czechs initiated the meetings 
of Foreign Affairs Ministry Directors (Regional Round Table on Capabilities 
Sharing) in 2011. Prague also wants the Baltic states to be involved in multilat-
eral co-operation (V4+B3).
Slovakia is a natural regional partner for the Czech Republic, but two decades 
following the separation of the two countries, their armed forces now differ con-
siderably while experiences from military co-operation so far are not construc-
tive and adversely affect mutual confidence. The two states have announced that 
they will pursue closer co-operation, for instance on transport and logistics, 
military training or firing range maintenance. However, there is a great asym-
metry in their respective attitudes towards more ambitious initiatives. Slovakia 
is relatively more open to large-scale co-operation concepts (joint acquisitions, 
air defence) that involve giving up certain capabilities to cut costs and letting 
an ally take over responsibility in the given area. The Slovak political elite lack 
determination with regard to financing defence. Bratislava is probably counting 
on concrete co-operation proposals from Poland and the Czech Republic. For ex-
ample, the idea to extend allied air policing to Slovakia has been raised. 
Military co-operation between Slovakia and Hungary has developed smooth-
ly for years (despite tensions in bilateral relations), but it cannot be the driv-
ing force behind any more ambitious regional initiatives, if anything because 
of the two states’ limited potentials. Under Victor Orbán’s rule, Hungary ex-
pects initiatives and has explicitly declared its openness to co-operation with 
Poland, however, considering its economic situation, the country’s capacity to 
develop such co-operation is rather limited, and Hungary’s contribution to the 
V4BG to be created will probably be the group’s weakest link.
2. THE CZECH REPUBLIC
2.1. Defence policy
The Czech Republic, neighbouring NATO allies and the neutral Austria, con-
siders the likelihood of a military attack on its territory to be low, but it has 
emphasised that an attack on any of its allies would be a challenge to its own 
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security. It has also pointed out the growing risk of asymmetric threats such 
as cyber attacks, treats to critical infrastructure, or interruptions in strate-
gic resources and energy supplies. The Czech Republic also regards Russia’s 
ambition to build a sphere of influence using a combination of political, eco-
nomic and military pressure, and the activity of the Russian secret services, 
as a threat to its own security and the security of its allies. Potential sources 
of problems include both politically motivated disruptions of the supplies of 
key resources and acquisitions of stakes in companies that manage critical in-
frastructures by risky economic actors. The Czech Republic is also concerned 
about the sustained high activity of the Russian secret services on its terri-
tory. However, Prague does not view Russia as a direct threat to its territorial 
security. The Russian-Georgian war polarised the Czech political scene. The 
centre-right government of Mirek Topolánek backed the Georgian side, while 
the leftist opposition argued that the government in Tbilisi was also partly to 
blame, and the Czech president Václav Klaus defended Russia’s position. 
The Czech Republic views the United States as its key partner and a guarantor 
of Czech and European security; it has striven for many years to obtain a US 
military presence on its territory. However, as the US withdrew from co-oper-
ation with the Czechs on the missile defence project, this prompted Prague to 
review its relations with Washington. The Czech Republic will readily partici-
pate in US global security projects, but it will no longer uncritically accept the 
US point of view. Prague puts a lot of emphasis on the development of technol-
ogy co-operation with the USA – the signature of an agreement granting Czech 
companies direct access to the US defence market was a success in this area. 
The Czech Republic is concerned about the change of the US defence strategy 
priorities and views it as a factor diminishing its security. According to Czech 
experts, Central Europe should come up with concrete projects that could serve 
as a kind of investment in transatlantic relations and which would strengthen 
Central Europe’s defence capabilities, including its expeditionary capabilities 
(the creation of V4BG could serve this purpose). 
There is a strongly held conviction in the Czech Republic that membership in 
NATO and Article 5 safeguard the country’s security and that, if under threat, 
the Czech Republic will receive assistance from its allies. The Czechs do not 
expect their own armed forces to be able to independently defend the coun-
try against an external threat, and count on the allied forces in this respect, 
with the Czech military tasked primarily with supporting the allied operation. 
According to Czech experts, however, this reasoning has led to deep cuts in the 
defence budget, which are not backed by any specific defence concept. Experts 
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predict that in the longer term, the only option for the armed forces of coun-
tries the size of the Czech Republic will be to specialise. Consequently, in some 
aspects the armed forces of those countries will depend on co-operation with 
their allies. The Czechs treat their involvement in foreign operations as a means 
of strengthening the guarantees of allied assistance, should the country come 
under threat. In the Czech view, collective defence and involvement in opera-
tions abroad are equally important and complementary. For this reason, the 
Czechs take their own participation in NATO operations seriously, considering 
it to be also a way to strengthen relations with the USA. Due to their limited 
military capabilities and the recent deep cuts in defence spending, the Czechs 
are now focused on the operation in Afghanistan. Another important project 
concerns the creation of the Multinational Aviation Training Centre (MATC) 
to be used by the NATO and EU countries for the training of helicopter pilots, 
ground personnel and instructors. Croatia is a partner on this project, talks are 
underway with Hungary, and an invitation is to be extended to Slovakia. The 
Czechs have been specialising in helicopter training for several years: since 
2009 they have been co-ordinating NATO’s HIP Helicopter Task Force (HHTF) 
and then the Helicopter Task Force Initiative, which involves the V4 states as 
well as Spain, Norway, the UK and Albania and consists in training and op-
erational co-operation among countries that possess the Mi helicopters. The 
project is based in the Pardubice training centre which currently trains pilots 
from the Afghan army, among other activities. In 2012, the Czechs launched 
the first training course for Croatian and Czech pilots to prepare them for the 
mission in Afghanistan where they will train Afghan pilots on how to operate 
the Mi-17. 
The CSDP does not feature prominently in debates on security and defence. 
The EU is regarded primarily as a guarantor of the region’s stability, but not its 
security, therefore the Czechs are focused on co-operation within NATO. The 
Czech Republic formally backs projects under the CSDP. Its involvement, how-
ever, is limited to those actions that can at the same time constitute a contribu-
tion to NATO. This refers to the V4BG and likewise to the MATC. 
The Czechs are keenly interested in developing regional co-operation and re-
gard the V4 as the primary multilateral format. However, co-operation does 
not necessarily have to consist in large projects involving the entire V4, since 
such projects could stumble on a number of major obstacles. Prague is there-
fore advocating the development of bilateral projects which the other coun-
tries may join. Regional co-operation should generate savings and added val-
ue, although according to the Czech Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministries, 
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it should not serve as justification for more cuts in defence spending (which the 
Finance Minister is insisting on). Therefore, developing regional co-operation, 
apart from serving commitments within NATO, may also help a section of the 
Czech political class in their efforts to maintain defence spending and even to 
increase it in the longer term). 
In reference to regional co-operation, the Czechs usually mention projects that 
concern co-operation among educational institutions, the joint use of firing 
ranges and training facilities (as a result of which the less effective units could 
be discarded); or joint projects of the arms sectors (e.g. the co-operation agree-
ment between Česká Zbrojovka and Poland’s Bumar concluded in 2011). The 
Czechs have also been raising questions about the feasibility and consequences 
of such closer co-operation. They are aware of the political problems involved 
in a decision to give up some capabilities and rely on an ally (such as the ally’s 
possible refusal to deliver on commitments following a change of government 
or due to internal policy reasons). In the view of the Czech Republic, it is nec-
essary that all parliamentary parties in the countries choosing to co-operate 
closely should agree on the scope of commitments regarding their allies, in-
cluding the possibility to amend laws in order to transfer some responsibility 
for the defence of one’s country to another state, or to use one’s own armed 
forces in the territory of another state without having to launch lengthy proce-
dures for foreign missions. 
Apart from the V4, the Czechs also regard Germany, Austria and the Balkan 
states, including Croatia in particular, as their regional partners. Co-operation 
with Croatia enables the Czech Republic to present itself in the international 
scene as a mature partner transferring its experience to a newer NATO mem-
ber. This approach is also reflected in the composition of the EU Battle Group 
(on duty in the second half of 2012), which includes, apart from the Czech Re-
public, also Germany, Austria, Croatia, Macedonia and Ireland. The Czech gov-
ernment is also interested in developing co-operation with the Baltic states, 
including in the V4+B3 format. The Czech JAS 39 jet fighters have participated 
in Baltic Air Policing, and Lithuania has expressed interest (in 2009) in pur-
chasing the Czech-made L-159A ALCA aircraft around 2018. 
2.2. Armed forces and the arms industry
The Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (21,700 troops in peacetime and 
25–30,000 during wartime) possess a small potential and are treated as 
one of the instruments of state policy. Since 2004, it has been a professional 
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force. It consists of the combat component (Joint Forces), which includes the 
Land Forces and the Air Force, and the logistics component (Support Forces), 
which is a separate branch mainly in the technical and administrative sense. 
The Czech Armed Forces are relatively well trained and equipped, with strong 
logistic facilities but with a limited potential and capabilities, mainly due to 
its size. Military spending increased slightly in the late 2000s, but since 2009 
it has decreased again from 1.6% of GDP to 1.1% of GDP in 2011 (corresponding 
to less than US$ 2.5 billion). More than 80% of the budget is spent on current 
activities. The priority for the current government is to consolidate public fi-
nance. Further cuts in military spending are therefore possible. The Czech 
Armed Forces have largely completed its reorganisation, which was to be im-
plemented by the end of this year and aimed at adapting to NATO standards, 
developing expeditionary capabilities and creating a professional military. 
The upgrades carried out in recent years have been scattered and limited to 
technically expanding the capability to take part in multinational operations 
(the purchase of new transport aircraft and wheeled personnel carriers). 
The Land Forces are the largest service branch of the Czech Armed Forces. 
At their core are two mechanised brigades, one of which includes an airborne 
battalion, it maintains a high level of combat readiness and is nominally a rap-
id response brigade. It is worth noting that the Liberec-based WMD protection 
battalion is the Czech Republic’s speciality in NATO (and also its contribution to 
the NRF). The technological levels of the Land Forces’ equipment vary. The only 
relatively modern equipment includes the Pandur II wheeled armoured person-
nel carriers, now being put into service; and to a lesser extent, the T-72M4CZ 
tanks upgraded in the Czech Republic, the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles and 
the DANA self-propelled howitzers. Most armament held by the Land Forces’ 
units date back to the mid 1980s (infantry fighting vehicles, artillery). The Air 
Force includes a relatively well-developed (and versatile) combat component, 
and a support component. At its core there are four squadrons in charge of air 
defence (a squadron of JAS 39 Gripen multirole fighter aircraft and a squadron 
of the combat and training L-159 ALCA aircraft), and support for the Land Forces 
(a squadron of Mi-24/Mi-35 combat helicopters and a squadron of combat and 
training L-39ZA Albatros aircraft), as well as two brigades – an air defence mis-
sile brigade and a command, control and surveillance brigade. The tactical air 
force units hold modern equipment (JAS 39, L-159); the same applies to transport 
aircraft (four CASA C-295) and the ground component of air defence. However, 
the remaining aircraft of the Air Force are Soviet and Czech-made machines 
made in the 1970s and 1980s. The Czech leadership has not yet taken the final de-
cision on the future of the JAS 39 fighters, on lease till 2015. A decision to extend 
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the lease will probably be taken already in 2012. The terms and conditions of the 
extension have already been agreed by the Czech Defence Ministry. Prague also 
plans to give up its combat helicopters and to specialise further still in transport 
helicopters (training, servicing, upgrades) with a view to developing capabilities 
beyond the needs of the Czech Armed Forces.
The ability of the Czech Armed Forces to engage in short-term, independent 
defence of country’s territory through a combined air and land operation is 
limited. The reserve system created after universal conscription was abolished 
can expand the potential of the Czech Armed Forces in wartime to a limited 
extent only. Taking into account the combined potential of the Czech military, 
the Czech Republic has a relatively high capability to participate in operations 
abroad. This includes even the ability to deploy a relatively independent con-
tingent with its own logistic facilities on site, but with limited ability to move 
to the operation theatre (as it has no means to transport heavy armament and 
military equipment).
The Czech arms industry has the potential to maintain world-class pro-
duction in some segments. The Czech aerospace companies are doing quite 
well in free market conditions (e.g. the manufacturer of light combat aircraft 
– Aero Vodochody), as are the manufacturers of small arms and light weap-
ons (Česká Zbrojovka, one of the largest manufacturers of this kind of weap-
ons in Europe), ammunition (including tank ammunition), wheeled chassis 
(Tatra, also for mortars and multiple missile launchers) and radio electronics 
for air defence systems (Retia), radars (Ramet) and communication systems 
(Era). The Czechs have also preserved capacity in the area of overhauls and 
upgrades of tanks (VOP-25 and VOP-26) and helicopters (LOM Praha), which 
are sufficient from the point of view of the current needs of the Armed Forces. 
However, maintaining this capacity is difficult because the military has been 
placing no major orders recently (although the Czechs do try to supply their 
Armed Forces with domestic products), and because it is dependent on export 
sales (Česká Zbrojovka sells 90–95% of its production abroad).
3. SLOVAKIA
3.1. Defence policy
Defence policy is not a major topic of public debate in Slovakia. While strategic 
documents do take into account threats to the country’s territorial integrity, 
they are not considered to be a prominent subject. Slovakia applies a broad 
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definition of security threats. This includes threats to energy and cyber net-
works, or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The country is 
aware that the potential of its armed forces is insufficient to independently de-
liver the prime objective of defence policy, i.e. ensure the security of the state 
and its citizens, and that security can only be assured within NATO. For this 
reason, Slovakia emphasises the importance of collective defence, and has de-
clared that it regards the security of its NATO partners as significant for its 
own security. The priority of Slovakia’s defence policy is to deliver on its com-
mitments in NATO. Bratislava does not view Russia as a threat to the security 
of its territory. However, it recognises that Slovakia’s dependence on a single 
source of energy resource supplies is a problem for the country’s energy secu-
rity (Slovakia was heavily affected by the 2009 gas crisis). According to many 
Slovak experts, Russia is not a fully predictable country; nonetheless it is nec-
essary to maintain dialogue with it and to foster the chances of partner re-
lations between NATO and Russia. The Slovaks also believe that they should 
co-operate with Russia at the bilateral level, but debates are ongoing about the 
scope of such co-operation. While right-wing circles are quite cautious about 
it, experts with links to the ruling left-wing party argue that the two coun-
tries should develop economic co-operation (e.g. by extending the broad gauge 
railway). During the Russian-Georgian war the Slovak prime minister Robert 
Fico blamed Georgia for having provoked the conflict, but at the same time con-
sidered Russia’s reaction to be excessive and called for an immediate ceasefire, 
while the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly criticised Russia. 
The current Slovak leadership is reluctant to emphasise the key role of the 
United States for Europe’s security, and is more willing to stress that it is 
NATO that guarantees the security of its members. Smer-SD, Slovakia’s ruling 
party, emphasises collective defence within NATO, and presents relations with 
the USA in the broader context of the need to preserve transatlantic links. In 
2009, Prime Minister Fico (who is back in office today) announced that as long 
as he remained the head of government, he would not allow the deployment of 
elements of the US missile defence in Slovakia. US-Slovak relations improved 
later on during Barack Obama’s presidency (for example, in 2010 Slovakia 
agreed to receive three former Guantanamo Bay detainees). Nevertheless, Slo-
vak experts are concerned about the eroding US presence in Europe, as they 
consider the United States to be the guarantor of stability in Europe and are 
aware of the European Union’s limitations with respect to security and defence 
policy. According to Slovak experts, cuts in the US military budget mean that 
US support (including financial support) for Central Europe, which has hith-
erto enhanced its capacity to modernise the armed forces, will decline. Joint 
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transatlantic projects may also be at risk, and the EU will have to manage pos-
sible conflicts in its peripheries on its own. 
During the works on NATO’s new strategic concept, Slovakia argued that the 
interpretation of Article 5 should not be extended because this could create the 
risk that NATO will not be able to fulfil all its tasks, leading to a devaluation of 
its collective defence commitments. Participation in operations abroad is a way 
for Slovakia to deliver on its commitments as an ally, but it is also treated as an 
important element of the country’s foreign and security policy, strengthening 
its international position and boosting its reliability. Despite the cuts in military 
spending, Slovakia has stepped up its military presence abroad in recent years, 
especially in Afghanistan. In addition, its priority has been also placed on these 
modernisation projects that are crucial for the involvement of the Slovak Armed 
Forces in NATO and EU operations. This also refers to Slovakia’s contribution to 
the NRF and the Battle Groups. However, Slovakia has been criticised at home for 
its management of the participation of the Armed Forces in foreign operations. 
As a rule, the country deploys units formed ad hoc, which are then dissolved once 
they return from the mission. It has also been criticised for carrying out only 
those investments which are oriented towards expeditionary missions. Slovak 
experts believe that the country should specialise in one concrete domain, and 
focus, for instance, on the deployment of combat units or the development of en-
gineering, chemical protection, or sapper units. The latter two types of opera-
tions have recently become a Slovak speciality. 
In recent years Slovakia has demonstrated a reserved attitude towards the 
CSDP, based on the assumption that it has no added value for the Slovak Armed 
Forces. It is possible that the current government will decide to back the CSDP 
politically but, due to the deep cuts in defence spending, Slovakia will be able 
to get involved in the CSDP only to the extent to which the activities will be 
complementary with NATO projects. 
The Czech Republic is Slovakia’s natural partner for regional co-operation, 
not only in the areas of security and defence. Slovakia is also interested in de-
veloping co-operation within the V4, whose achievements hitherto are cur-
rently being presented as enhancing the state’s security. Regional co-opera-
tion has even served as an example of measures that facilitate further cuts in 
defence spending during the coalition games under the previous centre-right 
government. However, Slovak experts are aware that the disparity of arma-
ment and military equipment possessed by the individual V4 members will 
considerably hamper joint projects. They believe that the modernisation and 
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replacement of land, aircraft and radar equipment is necessary in order to 
improve the opportunities for co-operation with the allied armed forces. New 
acquisitions would have to be financed from loans with repayment periods ex-
tending beyond the term of one government, and this is unrealistic at present. 
Slovakia is therefore likely to focus on projects that generate savings and which 
do not require major investments (e.g. joint exercises and training – Slovakia 
has been trying to convince its allies to use its special forces training range in 
Lešť). Alternatively it will specialise in specific domains, giving up some of its 
defence capabilities (though this is a less probable scenario). In recent years, 
Slovakia has co-operated more closely with Hungary, with which it maintains 
a joint contingent as part of the UN mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Bratislava 
also considers the Western Balkan states, including in particular Serbia – but 
also Montenegro and Croatia to which it is transferring its transformation ex-
perience – as partners for security co-operation. As regards Ukraine, while 
Bratislava supports the Euro-Atlantic ambitions in Kyiv’s policy and backs the 
Eastern Partnership, it considers the country to be a rather unreliable partner 
for regional co-operation. 
3.2. Armed forces and the arms industry
The Slovak Armed Forces (14,000 troops during peace, with limited ability 
to expand through mobilisation during wartime) have limited potential 
and are of little significance from the point of view of the state’s policy. 
It has been a professional force since 2006. It consists of the operational compo-
nent (the Land Forces and the Air Force), and the support component (Support 
and Training Forces). The Armed Forces’ equipment is mostly of the older types, 
with limited capabilities and potential. Financial constraints have been hinder-
ing re-arming and do not allow the Armed Forces to train systematically (only 
units that maintain constant readiness train more or less regularly, mainly as 
part of joint projects with their Western partners). Military spending, which 
was centred around 1.5% of GDP until 2009, has been decreasing in recent 
years (to 1.1% of GDP in 2011 (corresponding to slightly over US$ 1 billion) and 
will probably continue to decrease in the coming years, or remain unchanged. 
More than 85% of the military budget is spent on current activities. The Slo-
vak Armed Forces are continuing measures aimed at achieving full compliance 
with NATO standards (the Model 2015 programme). The changes are primarily 
designed to prepare units to serve within multinational forces (in a deteriorat-
ing financial situation this is happening mainly at the expense of other units). 
The second highest priority, i.e. participation in NATO’s air defence system 
NATINADS, should be seen as a project which has increasingly slim chances of 
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being implemented, considering the deteriorating financial and technological 
situation of Slovakia’s air force. Upgrades of equipment are not systematic and 
are limited to the equipment of the contingent serving in Afghanistan. 
The Land Forces are the main service branch of the Slovak military. Its core 
consists of two well-developed mechanised brigades. It is worth mentioning 
that the special forces regiment has been operationally separated from the 
Land Forces and is subordinated directly to the General Staff. The Land Forces’ 
equipment is at various technological levels; most items are either Slovak or 
Soviet-made and represent the technological standards of the mid-1980s. Even 
though the potential to upgrade is considerable, only maintenance and cur-
rent overhauls are being carried out. The potential of the Air Force is limited 
and largely obsolete. At the core of the combat air units are the relatively mod-
ern MiG-29 fighter aircraft, but only four of them are used in operations. The 
fleet of Mi-17 helicopters is worth mentioning – it is used, for instance, in joint 
operations with the special forces regiment. The Air Force does not have any 
combat helicopters, though. The ground component of air defence has a rela-
tively large capability (including a battery of long-range S-300 missiles) which 
fully shields the country’s air space.
The Slovak Armed Forces have limited capabilities to independently defend the 
country’s land territory. As regards air operations, they are fully dependent on 
allied support, as the Air Force’s ability to carry out short tactical operations 
is merely symbolic. Following the abolition of universal conscription, Slovakia 
did not create any system to increase the number of troops during wartime, 
nor did it develop any other capability oriented primarily or exclusively to-
wards defence of the country’s territory. The country is continuing to develop 
the capability to use the Armed Forces abroad. However, the Slovak military 
has no ambitions to take part in operations other than participation in another 
country’s contingent or a multinational contingent.
The Slovak arms industry to a large extent caters to the needs of the Land 
Forces (mainly with respect to weapons and munitions, but its products are 
not state-of-the-art. Most of them represent the technological standards of 
the mid 1980s. The dominant players are manufacturers of heavy armament 
and military equipment, including armour and artillery (ZTS corporation is 
a potentate), and manufacturers of missiles (Technopol), as well as providers 
of ammunition, including missiles (ZVS, Konstrukta). Slovak companies also 
manufacture radio-electronic equipment, optoelectronics and communication 
systems, albeit on a smaller scale (Konstrukta, Metrodat). Metapol Group is 
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noteworthy; this is a Slovak-Belarusian-Russian consortium that provides up-
grade packages for infantry fighting vehicles. Maintaining the arms industry’s 
potential is difficult due to the absence of major orders from the Slovak Armed 
Forces or potential importers.
4. HUNGARY 
4.1. Defence policy
Hungary considers military threats in a wider security context. It is aware of 
global threats such as regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, terrorism, natural and industrial disasters, organised crime, 
drugs trafficking, migrations and the undemocratic actions of radical groups, 
but it also points to threats to the country’s financial, energy and cyber secu-
rity. Hungary believes the likelihood of a conventional armed attack against its 
territory to be low, although it warns of the danger of disregarding it. Budapest 
regards the stability of its Western Balkan neighbourhood to be particularly 
important for its own security. It is in Hungary’s interests for the EU and NATO 
to step up their involvement in the region, as is the aspiration of the countries 
which neighbour them to become full members of the two organisations or to 
maintain as close relations as possible with them. Budapest advocates deeper 
co-operation between NATO and Russia, but also insists that such co-operation 
should take into account the interests of Central European states. 
Hungary considers the United States to be its key ally in the area of security 
and defence. Budapest is interested in a sustained US presence in Europe and 
in a continuing transatlantic strategic partnership. The USA has supported the 
Hungarian Armed Forces in recent years, including with financial donations, 
and has equipped the Hungarian contingent in Afghanistan with 14 Humvee 
vehicles and has offered 32 used helicopters. Hungary views NATO and Arti-
cle 5 as being the safeguards of its independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. The country has also been raising the question of expanding the pos-
sibilities of consultations under Article 4. Budapest backs greater EU activity 
in the areas of security and defence. One of the priorities of the Hungarian 
Presidency in the EU Council (first half of 2011) concerned deeper integration 
in the area of security and fostering NATO-EU co-operation. Hungary takes 
part in NATO and EU missions, both military and civil. Its priority is on the 
stabilisation of the Western Balkans and their integration into Euro-Atlantic 
structures. Hungary has a relatively extensive military presence in the region 
(KFOR, EUFOR ALTHEA), and is also involved in the mission in Afghanistan. 
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Budapest pursues regional co-operation with all of its neighbours within the 
framework of NATO and the EU, or under bilateral agreements. With Slovakia, 
it conducts joint training of military personnel (e.g. pilot training). A Hungarian - 
-Slovak unit has served on the UN mission in Cyprus since 2001. Hungary, Ro-
mania, Slovakia and Ukraine jointly created the Tisa engineering battalion in 
2002. Those countries’ commands have been working on methods for joint re-
sponse in the event of a natural disaster in the Tisa river region for a decade, but 
it is unclear if the unit could be practically deployed in a crisis situation because 
the relevant legal regulations are lacking. A Romanian-Hungarian peacekeep-
ing battalion created under a 1998 agreement became operational in 2000. How-
ever, while it has been engaged in joint exercises, it has never been deployed on 
a mission. Since 2007, Hungary has been participating in an Italian-led EU Battle 
Group with Italy and Slovenia (the Group is a successor of a former joint brigade 
created by the three countries). Hungary also is developing close defence co-op-
eration with Croatia and Serbia. Budapest has emphasised the need to support 
the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Western Balkan states, also in the V4 forum. It 
has been arguing that NATO should keep its “open door policy” in place for the 
Western Balkans. The government of Viktor Orbán has put greater emphasis 
on regional co-operation, especially within the V4, than its left-wing predeces-
sors. However, the potential for co-operation has been seriously impeded by the 
country’s economic situation which prevents Hungary from adopting an ambi-
tious approach to the creation of the V4BG (Hungary is less actively involved in 
the project than the other V4 members).
4.2. Armed forces and the arms industry
The Hungarian Armed Forces are small (19,000 troops in peacetime, lim-
ited ability to expand through mobilisation during war), have a limit-
ed potential, and are of little significance from the point of view of the 
state’s policy. They have been a professional force since 2004. They consist of 
the Land Forces and the Air Force, as well as support and combat support units 
subordinated directly to the Joint Forces Command (the separate commands of 
individual service branches were dismantled in late 2006). In wartime condi-
tions, the Border Guard (10,000 troops) of the Ministry of Justice and Public 
Administration may also be deployed to support the Armed Forces. The Hun-
garian military is mainly equipped with older types of armament and mili-
tary equipment, which offer limited potential and capabilities. Due to financial 
constraints, it has been facing difficulties in re-arming, and has not been able 
to train systematically (only the units that maintain constant readiness train 
more or less regularly, mainly as part of joint exercises with their Western 
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partners). Military spending has decreased in recent years from 1.3% of GDP in 
2007 to 1.0% of GDP in 2011 (corresponding to nearly US$ 1.4 billion). More than 
85% of the military budget is spent on current activities. Hungary has commit-
ted itself to keeping military spending at the current level in 2013–2015 and to 
increasing it, starting from 2016, to 1.39% of GDP by 2022. The principal objec-
tive of the Armed Forces reform plan to 2016 is to increase its interoperability 
within NATO and to re-arm. However, because of the financial constraints, 
upgrades have been limited to what is necessary to meet the needs of the Hun-
garian contingent in Afghanistan (Hungary has suspended acquisitions of new 
armament, the construction of the third NATINADS radar station and work on 
the guided missiles for the JAS 39 fighter aircraft). The directions the future 
development of the Armed Forces will take are unclear at the moment. 
The core of the ground component of the Joint Forces consists of two infan-
try brigades. Their heavy armament and military equipment are all Soviet-
-designed and made, and represent the technological standards of the mid-
1980s; and they are decreasing in quantity. Basic equipment includes the 
T-72M tanks (only 14 remain in service), the BTR-80A armoured personnel 
carriers and the now obsolete D-20 gun-howitzers. The priorities for mod-
ernisation are unclear. Upgrades are carried out in response to current needs 
(a limited upgrade of the BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers was launched in 
the mid-2000s, but was interrupted by the financial crisis). The Air Force and 
air defence troops are organised in two bases: the fighter aircraft base (JAS 39 
Gripen multirole fighter aircraft) and the helicopter base (the Mi-24 combat 
helicopters and the Mi-8/Mi-17 transport helicopters), and also include an air 
defence missile regiment and a signal and command and control support regi-
ment. Except for the state-of-the-art JAS 39 fighter aircraft leased from Swe-
den (the lease agreement was extended to 2026 in 2012) most of the equipment 
represents the technological standards of 1970s-1980s. Due to the need to cut 
costs, the relatively modern MiG-29 fighters were put out of service. At present 
an extension of the JAS Gripen lease and upgrades of the worn-out Mi-8/Mi-
17 helicopters or potential acquisitions of their successors make up the entire 
development concept of Hungary’s Air Force. The drastically constrained pilot 
training programme is noteworthy – except for the JAS 39 and transport heli-
copter pilots, Hungarian pilots exercise mainly using training facilities.
The Hungarian Armed Forces have limited capabilities to independently de-
fend the country’s territory through a short regular operation. Hungary has 
abolished universal conscription, but it has not created any alternative system 
to significantly expand the number of troops in wartime, nor has it developed 
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any other capability oriented primarily or exclusively towards defence of the 
country’s territory. It is continually working to develop its capabilities to de-
ploy its Armed Forces on foreign missions. However, the level of ambition with 
regard to foreign deployment is limited to participation in multinational con-
tingents or those of other countries.
The Hungarian arms industry has a small potential and is not capable of 
catering to the needs of the Armed Forces. Its products represent the tech-
nological standards of the mid-1980s and include, primarily, radio-electronics 
(ArmKom, Radiant, Videoton) as well as vehicle and equipment for engineer-
ing troops and WMD protection units (Csepel, Raba). In 2008 Raytheon opened 
a service and maintenance centre for the AGM-65 Maverick missiles, i.e. one of 
the basic types of armaments for the JAS 39. A potential modernisation of the 
Armed Forces would have to rely entirely on imported equipment. In 2012, the 
Defence Ministry released its Arms Industry Modernisation Plan, the objec-
tive of which is to enhance the ability of domestic manufacturers to cater to 
the needs of the Armed Forces and to expand the state’s role in the arms indus-
try. Given the current financial situation, the plan should be treated mainly as 
a declaration of intent, and not a basis of real change in the arms sector.
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IV. ROMANIA AND BULGARIA
1. ROMANIA
1.1. Defence policy
The strategic context of Romania’s policy is defined by the challenges in 
the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans and, more recently, also 
in the Middle East. The priority objective of Romania’s defence policy is to 
consolidate the country’s membership in NATO and the EU – the pillars of Ro-
mania’s broadly understood security – and to deepen the strategic partnership 
with the United States. Romania traditionally views Russia as a rival – with the 
geopolitical affiliation of neighbouring Moldova being the object of this rivalry 
– and as a source of problems in the Black Sea region. It has been calling for an 
“internationalisation” of the Black Sea region, i.e. a stepped up US and EU pres-
ence in that area, viewing this as an opportunity to expand its own influence 
and to enhance the security of the entire region. For this reason, Romania has 
been a determined advocate of Ukraine’s and Georgia’s accession to NATO, and 
has lobbied for Moldova’s and Turkey’s membership in the EU.
Romania’s location between the Western Balkans, the Black Sea region and the 
Middle East offers opportunities to build the country’s international position 
(including through co-operation with the USA) and to achieve economic de-
velopment (the prospects of goods and resources transit from the Caspian re-
gion). However, it also generates a relatively high level of threat, among which 
Romania counts international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, the development of missile programmes, and organised crime. 
Romania also views Russia as a source of problems in the Black Sea region 
because of Moscow’s direct or indirect involvement in the so-called “frozen 
conflicts” in Transnistria and the Caucasus, and also because of Russia’s with-
drawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and its con-
tinued criticism of NATO’s plans to build a missile defence system. Moldova, 
lost by Romania to the Soviet Union in 1940, is a special area of rivalry between 
Romania and Russia. The Romanians stand by the principle of Moldova’s ter-
ritorial integrity and have been objecting to the presence of Russian troops in 
separatist Transnistria. The Russian context also determines Romania’s rela-
tions with Ukraine. Even though tensions exist between the two countries – 
for example over respecting the rights of national minorities – Romania has 
consistently backed the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO and the EU, fear-
ing that otherwise Ukraine will find itself in the Russian sphere of influence. 
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While Romania considers Russia to be generating problems in the region, 
it does not believe that Russia poses a direct threat to the security of its terri-
tory. The 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict did not affect the Romanian percep-
tion of threats – it only reaffirmed the original assumptions of Romania’s de-
fence policy, according to which the risk of destabilisation in the region is high. 
Finally, internal factors also come into the broadly understood concept of Ro - 
mania’s security. These include: issues related to ineffective state institu-
tions, corruption, problems caused by the economic crisis, and energy security 
(in connection with Romania’s aspiration to become the EU’s gateway for Cas-
pian resources). 
The United States is Romania’s most important security and defence part-
ner, and the two countries maintain close military relations. In 2006 Roma-
nia signed an agreement under which it granted US forces access to its mili-
tary bases as part of the Task Force East initiative (the Kogălniceanu airfield 
and the Constanța sea port serve as transit and logistics bases for US troops 
deployed in Afghanistan and, previously, in Iraq) and, in 2011 the two coun-
tries concluded an agreement on the deployment of an SM-3 missile launcher, 
which forms part of the US missile defence system, at the airfield in Deveselu. 
Co-operation with the USA also includes joint military exercises, US financial 
assistance in the modernisation of Romania’s Armed Forces, and close intelli-
gence co-operation. Romania considers its co-operation with the United States 
to be a factor strengthening its position in the region. For the US, Romania is 
the single most important partner in South-Eastern Europe, providing transit 
and logistic support for the operations in Afghanistan, the Black Sea region 
and, potentially, in the Middle East. The ongoing transformation of the US se-
curity strategy is seen in Romania as an opportunity rather than a threat, since 
the country is benefiting from the diminishing US involvement in Western 
Europe. For the last two decades, the Romanian political elite has maintained 
a broad consensus about the need to preserve close relations with the United 
States. However, the scale and dynamics of the political war that has been in 
place since mid-2012 between the centre-left government and the centre-right 
president may result in the internal disputes expanding into the foreign policy 
area, and would thus weaken the pro-US line of Romania’s foreign policy. 
Romania advocates maintaining NATO’s military character and regards Arti-
cle 5 as the organisation’s foundation. It considers the deployment of elements 
of NATO infrastructure (the missile defence system) on its territory to consid-
erably enhance its security. It has, however, been stressing that NATO should 
take new threats into account, including the challenges related to the security 
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of energy resource supplies and cyber threats. Romania has not called for them 
to be also covered by Article 5, though. Bucharest views NATO’s involvement 
in foreign operations as complementary to collective defence, and not in com-
petition with it. The country’s considerable and sustained participation in NA-
TO’s foreign operations is regarded as an important contribution to enhancing 
NATO’s reliability and cohesion – and hence the security of Romania – and as 
an element of the alliance with the USA. It is also helpful in modernising and 
training the Armed Forces, and adapting them to NATO standards. Romania 
also attaches great significance to the “open door policy” and the development 
of NATO’s partnerships, which for Bucharest are a way to build an area of se-
curity and stability in its neighbourhood. 
Romania treats its contribution to the CSDP as an important instrument with 
which it can consolidate its position within the EU, but at the same time it em-
phasises that a strong NATO and strong transatlantic relations should be the 
foundation of security. In 2010 Romania had the third largest number of per-
sonnel deployed on EU missions (due to its large contribution to the EULEX 
mission in Kosovo), but currently its involvement in EU missions has subsided 
considerably (due to cuts in defence spending and the withdrawal from Ko-
sovo). Romania also attaches great significance to the development of the mili-
tary police, including in the European context; since 2009 it has been a mem-
ber of the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) co-created by France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. It backs the EUBG initiative and participates 
in two Battle Groups: the Balkan BG (with Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus, 2007) 
and the Italian-Romanian-Turkish Battle Group (2010). Romania attaches great 
political significance to regional co-operation in the Black Sea region, e.g. since 
2009 it has been taking part in Black Sea Harmony, an anti-terror operation 
initiated by Turkey in 2004. Furthermore, twice a year it takes part in BLACK-
SEAFOR, an exercise of the navies of all the Black Sea countries. Romania also 
co-operates with its neighbours by participating in the joint peacekeeping bat-
talion with Hungary, and the “Tisa” engineering battalion with Ukraine, Hun-
gary and Slovakia. 
Romania recognises the need for closer political and military co-operation 
in the region at present, mainly due to the economic crisis, which in Roma-
nia has triggered one of the deepest and longest recessions in the EU. Its pre-
ferred area of co-operation is in joint purchases of armament and military 
equipment – Romania has signalled its willingness to jointly purchase fighter 
aircraft with Bulgaria and Croatia; it has also signed an agreement on air po-
licing with Bulgaria (September 2012). It also seeks to continue and to extend 
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military co-operation with Turkey which it sees as its key partner in the Black 
Sea region. This co-operation is important especially in the domains of missile 
defence and combating terrorism and illegal migration. In the Western Bal-
kans, Serbia is the main partner with which Bucharest intends to develop co-
operation on military exercises. Finally, Poland is Romania’s relatively “young-
est” partner for military co-operation. 
1.2. Armed forces and the arms industry
The Romanian Armed Forces (73,000 troops during peacetime, 153,000 
during wartime) have a large potential and are treated as an instrument 
of state policy. They were professionalised in 2007. The Armed Forces include 
an operational component (the Land Forces, the Air Force and the Navy) and 
support structures under the Joint Logistic Command, which are nevertheless 
operationally distributed among the different service branches. The Romanian 
Armed Forces have large quantities of armament and military equipment, but 
mostly of older types. Financial constraints have hindered their re-arming, 
and have also prevented systematic training (only the units that maintain con-
stant readiness and the relatively well-developed special forces units train on 
a regular basis, usually in joint exercises with Romania’s Western allies). Mili-
tary spending has decreased in recent years (from 1.5% of GDP in 2007 to 1.3% of 
GDP, i.e. US$ 2.4 billion 2011). 90% of the military budget is spent on current ac-
tivities. Romania is currently implementing a three-step modernisation of the 
Armed Forces. They are set to achieve full compatibility with NATO standards 
– also with regard to armament and military equipment – by 2015. By 2025, it 
is expected to develop logistic capabilities to increase its expeditionary capa-
bilities and become relatively independent of its allies, and to achieve an equal 
technological level. Insufficient funding has hindered the implementation of 
those plans; therefore, the objectives will be attained later than planned and 
their scope will most likely be limited. 
The Land Forces are the largest service branch of the Romanian military. 
At its core are three divisions structured into brigades (a total of nine general 
brigades, including two mountain infantry brigades). The mountain infantry 
brigades play a special role as, inter alia, the units from which the battalions 
taking part in combat operations in Afghanistan are recruited. The special 
forces regiment is also worth mentioning since it serves as the core of the 
Special Forces that also comprise units from the other service branches. The 
technological levels of the Land Forces’ equipment vary, with most of the items 
representing the technological standards of the mid-1980s. The Piranha III 
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armoured personnel carriers are the only state-of-the-art items held by the 
Land Forces. Other items have only partly been upgraded, or are currently 
being upgraded. Except for the acquisition of the armoured personnel carri-
ers mentioned above (which are mainly for the purposes of the mission in Af-
ghanistan), the Land Forces’ upgrade plans are reliant on the products of the 
domestic arms industry. The Air Force includes a comprehensively developed 
combat component and also support units. At the core of the Air Force are five 
combat squadrons and a surface to air missiles brigade. The equipment held 
by the Air Force is largely obsolete. Some upgrades were undertaken in recent 
years despite the financial constraints: the airlift units and the helicopter fleet 
are being upgraded as a priority (mainly for the purposes of ensuring support 
for the contingent in Afghanistan). Choosing the successors for the obsolete 
MiG-21 Lancer fighter aircraft (which have not been approved for operations 
with NATO joint forces) is the Air Force’s greatest challenge. In June 2012 the 
Air Force disclosed a plan to buy 15 used F-16 jet fighters from the Dutch Armed 
Forces (provided the financial situation improves, Romania has plans to buy 
a total of 24 used and 24 new F-16s. The question of upgrading the ground com-
ponent of air defence has not yet been resolved. The Navy has a relatively high 
strike capability (3 frigates and 7 corvettes) which is relatively modern for 
Black Sea conditions (even though it represents the technological standards of 
the mid-1980s). Romania has no submarine fleet, but it does have a strong river 
flotilla on the Danube. 
The Romanian Land Forces and the Navy are relatively well-prepared to in-
dependently ensure regular defence of the country’s territory and to secure 
Romania’s interests in the Black Sea. The Air Force’s ability to engage in in-
dependent operations is highly limited, making Romania dependent on sup-
port from its allies. In some respects, such as mountain warfare, the Roma-
nian Armed Forces are also well-prepared to engage in irregular operations. 
Their capabilitiy to take part in operations abroad is also relatively good. In 
future, the Romanian Armed Forces should develop a capability to deploy an 
independent contingent (with its own logistic support).
Romania has a well-developed arms industry. Its main disadvantage, 
though, is that it lags behind technologically despite some improvements hav-
ing been achieved by the acquisition of Western licences. The largest manu-
facturers of tanks, artillery, small arms and ammunition all operate under 
the umbrella of the state-controlled RomArm company (Mecanika, Ratmil Re-
gie Autonoma, Roman, MFA SA Mizil). The Romanian arms industry also has 
the capacity to manufacture and upgrade aircraft, including combat aircraft, 
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and aircraft components (Avioane, Aerostar, which also produces armament 
for the Land Forces, Romaero), helicopters (IAR), aircraft engines (Turbome-
canica, working under a Rolls-Royce licence), guided missiles (Aerofina), radio 
electronics for fighting vehicles, command and communication systems (Ele-
ktromagnetica, working under a German licence), communication systems 
(Elprof, working under a British licence), radar stations (UTI Systems in co-
operation with Lockheed Martin) and optoelectronics (Pro Optica). The ship-
building industry has experience in building all the vessel types currently in 
service in Romania’s Navy (the Mangalia shipyard), but it has not been able to 
attain an adequate technological level.
2. BULGARIA
2.1. Defence policy
The strategic context of Bulgaria’s policy is defined by the country’s 
location in the neighbourhood of three “unstable” regions: the West-
ern Balkans, the Black Sea and the Middle East. Bulgaria considers non-
military risks related to a possible destabilisation of those regions – includ-
ing the rise of organised crime, smuggling or a sudden migration pressure 
– to be the main threats to its broadly understood security, and attaches no 
greater significance to military threats. The only significant military threat 
in Bulgaria’s view is a possible missile attack from the Middle East. The pri-
ority of Bulgaria’s policy is to consolidate the country’s membership in NATO 
and the EU, and to support the enlargement of these organisations into the 
Western Balkans and the Black Sea regions. Other issues of importance for 
Bulgaria include: internal security concerns such as effective ways to com-
bat organised crime and corruption, and enhanced energy security. Defence 
policy issues are treated as being of secondary importance – when the crisis 
set in, it was in the defence sector that the deepest cuts were made. Bulgar-
ia has historically had good relations with Russia, under whose patronage 
the country gained independence and freed itself of the “Turkish yoke” in 
the 19th century. Those experiences continue to influence the Bulgarian per-
ception of the strategic context – Bulgaria is wary of military co-operation 
with Turkey, and has declared that it could act as a mediator should relations 
between the West and Russia deteriorate (e.g. it suggested that its territory 
could serve as a neutral ground for peace negotiations during the 2008 Rus-
sian-Georgian war). However, the traditionally good relations with Russia 
do not mean that Sofia’s and Moscow’s positions on security are the same. For 
example, Bulgaria has firmly backed Georgia’s territorial integrity and has 
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expressed possible consent to having elements of the missile defence system 
deployed in its territory. Emphasising good relations with Moscow is a way 
for Bulgaria to strengthen its international position, but Sofia does it in a way 
which does not to call into question the fact that Bulgaria is now embedded in 
the Euro-Atlantic structures. Bulgaria has historically competed with Serbia 
for the status of Balkan leader, but currently the two states have been co-
operating closely with respect to security. Bulgaria has also been an advo-
cate of Macedonia’s membership in NATO and the EU, but the two countries’ 
shared history and language (Bulgaria having called into question the status 
of Macedonian as a separate language) are also a source of tension in their 
relations. There have been signals that Bulgaria may withdraw its support 
for Macedonia.
The United States is Bulgaria’s most important security partner. Bulgaria 
made its military infrastructures available to the USA under a 2006 agreement 
concerning the Task Force East, and the facilities currently serve as logistics 
and training centres for US troops being moved to Afghanistan and, potential-
ly, to the Middle East (and in previous years, also to Iraq). Co-operation also in-
cludes joint exercises and US assistance in the modernisation of the Bulgarian 
Armed Forces. The United States views Bulgaria as an important partner in the 
region, but prefers, however, co-operation with Romania. Part of the reason 
for this is probably Bulgaria’s smaller potential and the fact that the country 
has relatively short tradition of working together with the USA. Bulgaria’s re-
action to the change in the US defence doctrine has been balanced, and the new 
direction of the US security policy is seen in Bulgaria as natural phase in the 
transformations of US presence in Western Europe, which is actually resulting 
in greater US involvement in South-Eastern Europe through the deployment of 
elements of the US missile defence system in the region. 
In NATO, Bulgaria has been emphasising the importance of Article 5 as “fun-
damental” for its security. Nevertheless, it has been pointing out that its provi-
sions are not sufficiently precise. It has called for the creation of contingency 
plans for all member states, and has championed the principle that a single 
NATO member should not have the right to veto the application of those plans. 
Bulgaria treats its participation in international operations as a way to deliver 
on its commitments within NATO, and also as an instrument to enhance the 
professionalism of its Armed Forces, and a way to build international prestige. 
Despite the economic crisis and the very deep cuts in defence spending, Bul-
garia has stepped up its involvement in foreign missions (e.g. the contingent 
in Afghanistan). However, major political parties in Bulgaria (the centre-right 
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GERB and the post-communist BSP) disagree on the country’s participation in 
operations abroad. GERB, in power since 2009, has been actively advocating an 
expansion of Bulgaria’s expeditionary capabilities This has been criticised by 
the leftist opposition which is less enthusiastic about an expeditionary model 
of the Armed Forces and foreign military involvement. 
Bulgaria views participation in the CSDP mainly as a means of consolidating 
its membership in the EU (hence its relatively high involvement in EU opera-
tions), but at the same time sees CSDP as a potential threat to the development 
capabilities within NATO. Bulgaria has opposed the creation of a permanent 
EU operational headquarters, arguing that it could duplicate the functions of 
NATO’s command structures.
Bulgaria is seeking to develop closer regional co-operation mainly with its 
Western Balkan partners. The South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG), 
which Bulgaria co-created with Albania, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey 
and Italy is the flagship initiative. Bulgaria has been advocating the creation of 
a permanent command for the brigade and has lobbied for the SEEBRIG head-
quarters to be established on its territory. In the Western Balkans, Bulgaria is 
also involved in co-operation in the area of internal security, including com-
bating cross-border and organised crime, terrorism and smuggling (SEECP). 
In the Black Sea region, the country takes part in the BLACKSEAFOR exercis-
es (a biannual exercise of rescue and humanitarian operations involving one 
navy vessel from each Black Sea state). On the other hand, it was only in 2011 
that Sofia expressed an interest in taking part in the Black Sea Harmony anti-
terror operation initiated by Turkey in 2004 – this could mean that Bulgaria is 
becoming more interested in military co-operation with Turkey. The economic 
crisis has provided an impulse for closer military co-operation in the region. 
In 2010, Bulgaria signed an agreement on air policing with Greece and, in 2012, 
with Romania. Bucharest is increasingly being regarded as Sofia’s main part-
ner in NATO. In late 2011, the two states established a mechanism for annual 
intergovernmental consultations, and they have pointed out that they might 
also co-operate on joint purchases of armament and military equipment, in-
cluding multi-role fighter aircraft. Bulgaria also seeks to “internationalise” its 
firing ranges and has been developing close military co-operation with Serbia 
in this respect. Bulgaria has been also trying to use the smart defence initia-
tive to boost its international position (it has proposed that a special centre for 
smart defence at one of Bulgaria’s universities be established) and as a devel-
opment opportunity for its arms industry (the optical, electronics and light 
weapons sectors).
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2.2. Armed forces and the arms industry
The Bulgarian Armed Forces have a total of 26,100 troops during peace-
time; their potential is small, and the they are treated as an instrument 
of state policy. Following their professionalisation in 2008 it most likely has 
no plans in place to mobilise reserves during wartime. They consist of the Land 
Forces, the Air Force and the Navy. Most of the armament and military equip-
ment are older types. Financial problems have hindered re-arming and have 
had an adverse impact on the level of training (the Armed Forces do not train 
much, mostly during joint exercises with Bulgaria’s Western partners). Mili-
tary spending has decreased in recent years from 2.4% of GDP in 2007 to 1.4% of 
GDP, i.e. US$ 760 million, in 2011. More than 90% of the military budget is spent 
on current activities. The Bulgarian Armed Forces have still not been able to 
attain the expected levels of compatibility and interoperability with NATO. 
The changes implemented over the last couple of years have been intended pri-
marily to prepare selected units to operate within multi-national forces. The 
directions that the Armed Forces’ transformations have taken have remained 
unchanged since 2004 when the first programme for the modernisation of the 
Bulgarian Armed Forces to 2015 was adopted; the deteriorating financial condi-
tions have only resulted in the scale of the reforms being reduced. In 2011 Bul-
garia adopted a new military investments plan for the years 2011–2020, under 
which most of the projects provided for in the 2004 programme are to be im-
plemented, albeit in more modest variants. However, due to the financial con-
straints, only the most important projects aimed at preparing selected units to 
co-operate within multinational forces will be carried out. 
The Land Forces are the biggest service branch in the Bulgarian military. At 
their core are four well-developed brigades (two mechanised brigades, a light 
infantry brigade and a special operations brigade) whose equipment consists 
primarily of items designed and built by Soviets, dating back to the 1970s-1980s 
and overhauled to a limited extent only. The priority for the modernisation of 
the Land Forces is to form and equip (with one of the mechanised brigades 
serving as the core) an expeditionary battalion battle group (of approximately 
one thousand soldiers) that could take part in NATO operations as a component 
of a multinational tactical level unit, with the possibility to rotate every six 
months. The creation and maintenance of a unit of this kind which, by neces-
sity, will engage the potential of an entire brigade, will consume most of the 
funding available for the Land Forces’ maintenance and modernisation. The 
Air Force is relatively large (three fighter squadrons and one mixed squadron, 
an air defence missile brigade and a radio-technical regiment), however it is 
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not a major force capable of independent operation. As in the case of the Land 
Forces, its armament is mostly Soviet-made and designed (MiG-21bis fighters, 
S-75 Volokhov missiles). Twelve combat aircraft of all types (including five 
MiG-29 fighters) maintain operational readiness. The ground component of air 
defence has a relatively high capabilities – when compared with the remaining 
components – due to the Russian-made long-range S-300 missile systems. The 
Air Force is being modernised to the greatest extent possible. Recent acquisi-
tions include new transport aircraft and helicopters. The current priority is 
to purchase eight multirole fighter aircraft (most probably used Eurofighter 
Typhoon or F-16) by 2015 and another eight in the second half of the decade. 
Despite playing a secondary role in Bulgaria’s defence doctrine, the Navy is 
in a slightly better situation with respect to equipment than the other service 
branches, as it has recently acquired some Western-designed and manufac-
tured items (including three missile frigates). Even though the vessels were 
not the newest, they enabled the Navy to achieve relative interoperability with 
NATO’s naval forces. Bulgaria’s priority now is to restore full operational capa-
bility to the frigates in order to make one available for NATO operations for 3 to 
6 months. Bulgaria has decided not to keep any submarine forces as part of its 
Navy. The measures undertaken to upgrade the radio-navigation equipment 
of the fleet are intended to enhance its ability to operate within multinational 
forces.
The Bulgarian Armed Forces have a limited ability to engage in short-term, 
independent defence of country’s territory, and the ability of the Air Force to 
carry out independent operations is residual and concerns the tactical level 
only. After abolishing universal conscription Bulgaria did not create a system 
to expand the size of its Armed Forces during wartime, nor is it developing any 
other capabilities related primarily or exclusively to the defence of country’s 
territory. The Bulgarian Armed Forces are in the process of developing capa-
bilities to take part in operations abroad. Ultimately, the Armed Forces will 
be able to participate in such missions only as part of another state’s multina-
tional contingent.
Bulgaria has a relatively well developed arms industry which produces 
lighter arms and military equipment based on older, Soviet designs represent-
ing the technological standards of the 1970s-1980s. Its products include small 
arms and light weapons (the Arsenal plant), explosives (Videx JSC), ammuni-
tion (Arcus), aircraft bombs (Dunarit) and unguided missiles (Vazovski Zavod), 
as well as optical instruments (Opticoelectron Group, Optix) and communica-
tions equipment (Samel-90PLC), all relatively low-tech. The Bulgarian arms 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
87
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
12
/2
01
2
industry also has the technological capacity to produce light tracked fighting 
vehicles under a licence for the Soviet MT-LB personnel carrier (Terem). Only 
part of the arms manufactured in Bulgaria meet NATO standards (STANAG). 
Most products are destined for export to less-developed countries. In that 
market segment, the Bulgarian arms industry is able to meet the needs of its 
country’s Armed Forces. It also has a limited capacity to overhaul and maintain 
heavy armament and military equipment such as tanks and air force and navy 
equipment (Terem EAD).
Text completed early September 2012
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APPENDICES
GLOSSARY OF NAMES AND ABBREVIATIONS
A
ABC – atomic, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction 
ARRC – Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, one of the eight formations of NATO’s 
Allied Joint Forces in Europe
ASDE – Air Situation Data Exchange, a programme for the exchange of infor-
mation on the situation in the airspace of NATO member states
B
BALTDEFCOL – Baltic Defence College, a military academy for officers from 
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and partner states; located in Tartu, Estonia 
Baltic Air Policing – NATO Air Defence Quick Reaction Alert in the Baltic 
States
BALTNET – Baltic Air Surveillance Network, an airspace control system cov-
ering the Baltic states; it forms part of NATINADS
BALTRON – Baltic Naval Squadron, a squadron of the mine warfare vessels 
of the Baltic states; it forms part of SNMCMG1
BLACKSEAFOR – Black Sea Naval Force, an ad hoc formation of the naval forces 
of all the Black Sea states (Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, Georgia, Bulgaria, Roma-
nia) which conducts joint sea rescue, humanitarian and mine countermeasure 
exercises at least twice a year
BRTE – Baltic Region Training Event, a series of NATO exercises and train-
ing organised in the Baltic states and aimed at enhancing interoperability be-
tween the armed forces of the Baltic states and the allied forces
C
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States
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CMX – Crisis Management Exercise, an annual NATO exercise in crisis man-
agement
CoE – NATO Centre of Excellence 
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union
CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union
E
EDA – European Defence Agency 
EGF – European Gendarmerie Force, an initiative of EU Member States aimed 
at enhancing the capabilities of the military gendarmerie 
EPAA – European Phased Adaptive Approach, part of the US missile defence 
system to be incorporated into the projected NATO missile defence system
e-PINE – Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe, a US Department of State 
programme addressed to the Nordic and Baltic states 
ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy, the new name introduced by the 
Treaty of Lisbon is CSDP
EUBG – European Union Battle Group
EUFOR Althea – European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EULEX Kosovo – European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, the EU polic-
ing mission in Kosovo
H
HNS – Host Nation Support, civil and military assistance provided by the host nation 
to the NATO allied forces deployed in its territory or moving across its territory
J
JFTC – Joint Force Training Centre, NATO training centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland
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JTAC – Joint Terminal Attack Controller, a soldier guiding air strikes from the 
ground
K
KFOR – Kosovo Force, a NATO-led international military operation in Kosovo
M
MATC – Multinational Aviation Training Centre, a NATO training institution 
for helicopter pilots and ground personnel, currently being established in the 
Czech Republic
MCPPN – Marine Corps Prepositioning Program Norway, a programme for the 
storage of the US Marine Corps’ armament and military equipment in Norwe-
gian territory
MEDEVAC – Medical Evacuation, rescue operations consisting in the trans-
portation to medical facilities of the injured from a battlefield or an area af-
fected by a natural disaster
MNMPBAT – Multinational Military Police Battalion, a NATO formation cre-
ated at the initiative of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Croatia
N
NATINADS – NATO Integrated Air Defence System
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NB8 – a format of regional co-operation between the Nordic states (Sweden, 
Finland, Norway, Iceland) and the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) with 
regular meetings at the levels of heads of government, ministers, secretaries of 
states, political directors from the ministries as well as members of parliaments
NBG – Nordic Battlegroup, a European Union Battle Group formed by Sweden, 
Finland, Estonia and Norway (framework nation: Sweden)
NDN – Northern Distribution Network, a network of ground supply routes 
serving the purposes of the OEF and ISAF missions in Afghanistan; it connects 
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the Baltic and Black Sea ports with Afghanistan via roads and rail connections 
in Russia, the Caucasus and the countries of Central Asia 
NORDAC – Nordic Armaments Cooperation, a Nordic organisation for co-oper-
ation on joint research and development of armament and military equipment 
and joint acquisitions, incorporated into NORDEFCO in 2009
NORDCAPS – Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support, 
a Nordic organisation in charge of co-ordinating Nordic co-operation on peace-
keeping missions, incorporated into NORDEFCO in 2009
NORDEFCO – Nordic Defence Cooperation, a Nordic organisation for military 
co-operation, formed by Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and, nominally, 
Iceland
NORDSUP – Nordic Supportive Defence Structures, a Nordic organisation for 
co-operation on the maintenance and development of military capabilities, in-
corporated into NORDEFCO in 2009
NRF – NATO Response Force, NATO’s rapid response force on high readiness
O
OCC – Operational Capabilities Concept within the framework of NATO’s Part-
nership for Peace programme
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom, a series of US military operations within 
the framework of the “war on terror”, including in Afghanistan (OEF-A)
P
PARP – Planning and Review Process within the framework of NATO’s Part-
nership for Peace programme
PfP – Partnership for Peace, a programme for co-operation between NATO and 
states in the Euro-Atlantic area, currently mainly countries of the CIS and the 
former Yugoslavia, but also Western European partners that are not NATO 
members
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S
SAC – Strategic Airlift Capability, a consortium of ten NATO member states as 
well as Sweden and Finland, created for the purpose of purchasing and jointly 
operating Boeing C-17 transport aircraft from a base in Hungary
SEEBRIG – South-Eastern Europe Brigade, a military formation of the Multi-
national Peace Force of South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE), intended for partici-
pation in peace operations, created by Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, 
Romania, Turkey and Italy
SNMCMG1 – Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1
SECI – Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, an organisation of thirteen 
states in South-East Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Tur-
key and Hungary), initiated by the OSCE and aimed at close co-operation in 
combating cross-border crime
SEECP – South-East European Cooperation Process, the most important forum 
for co-operation in South-East Europe, whose objectives include strengthen-
ing security, stability and good neighbourly relations, as well as integration 
within NATO and the European Union 
STANAG – Standardization Agreement, an agreement laying down processes, 
procedures, terms and conditions for common military or technical proce-
dures and equipment of NATO member states
Stealth – technologies aimed at decreasing the detectability of objects with 
known observation methods
STRATEVAC – Strategic Medical Evacuation, air evacuation at the strategic 
level, the domain of the United States Air Force within NATO
SUCBAS – Sea Surveillance Co-operation Baltic Sea, a co-operation system for 
the exchange of information on the situation at sea among the countries of the 
Baltic Sea basin (all except Russia)
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U
UNFICYP – United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
V
V4 – Visegrád Four, member states of the Visegrád Group
V4BG – V4 Battle Group, the Battle Group formed by Visegrád Group member 
states
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Table 1. Military spending in 2007–2011 (US$ million)
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania 
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary Poland
2011
official 4518 3652 7232 6103 389 351 289 758 2380 2448 1065 1378 8908
according to SIPRI 4515 3656 7083 5960 336 405 267 722 1945 2254 968 1287 9149
as % of GDP 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.7 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.7
2010
official 4504 3461 6499 6157 332 326 251 832 2086 2660 1138 1351 8502
according to SIPRI 4504 3400 6390 5886 330 410 260 894 2086 2498 1130 1351 8781
as % of GDP  
(according to SIPRI)*
1.5 1.4 1.6 (1.5) 1.3 1.8 (1.7) 0.9 (1.1) 1.0 (1.1) 1.7 (1.9) 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 (1.0) 1.8 (1.9)
2009
official 4337 3556 6196 5672 353 402 316 905 2225 3129 1350 1476 7475
according to SIPRI 4230 3474 6596 5438 429 487 343 940 2265 2752 1293 1506 8414
as % of GDP  
(according to SIPRI)
1.4 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.8 (2.3) 1.1 (1.4) 1.2 (1.4) 1.9 (2.0) 1.4 1.6 (1.4) 1.5 1.2 (1.1) 1.7 (1.8)
2008
official 4788 3105 6371 5793 430 531 539 1162 3000 3090 1411 1899 8165
according to SIPRI 4499 3309 6215 5545 471 638 540 989 2664 2673 1351 1690 7848
as % of GDP  
(according to SIPRI)
1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 (1.2) 1.8 (2.1) 1.1 (1.4) 1.6 (1.7) 2.2 (2.0) 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.5 (1.7)
2007
official 4175 2848 5875 6264 371 453 444 990 2608 2527 1139 1776 7833
according to SIPRI 4332 3074 6181 6235 488 611 552 1181 2417 3136 1320 1819 8774
as % of GDP  
(according to SIPRI)
1.3 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.7 (2.1) 1.2 (1.4) 1.5 (1.7) 2.4 (2.5) 1.5 1.4 (1.6) 1.5 1.3 1.8 (2.0)
* Only where different from calculations based on official budget documents.  
No SIPRI calculations are available for 2011.
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Table 2. Numbers of service personnel at end of 2011 / beginning of 2012  
(thousands)
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary Poland
total:
– posts
– actual 
numbers*
18 15 (34.7**)
15
23
21
21 5.5 8.5 5 29
26.1
73
66
23
21.7
16
14
19 100
in this***:
– Army
– Air Force
– Navy
9.1
3.4
3.5
8.7 (27.3**)
3.1 (4.4**)
2.3 (3**)
7.5
2.1
3.7
7.3
3.6
3.4
4.95
0.25
0.3
6.5
1
0.5
4
0.25
0.5
15
6.5
3.4
45.8
9.7
7.1
6.2
4.6
–
7
4
–
11
5
–
60
25.4
10.1
% of popula-
tion
0.32 0.28 (0.64**) 0.46 0.22 0.42 0.27 0.22 0.39 0.33 0.21 0.26 0.19 0.26
military 
spending 
per 1 active 
service 
person (US$ 
thousands)
251 243.7 344.4 290.1 70.7 41.3 57.8 29 36.1 112.8 76.1 72.5 89.2
* Where significantly different from the number of posts.
** Finland has the capacity to more than double the number rapidly during peacetime.
*** Formations outside the three service branches and home guard maintained by the armed forces  
during peacetime were not included. In the case of Hungary, where the service branches are not  
organisationally separate, the numbers are indicative.
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Table 2. Numbers of service personnel at end of 2011 / beginning of 2012  
(thousands)
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary Poland
total:
– posts
– actual 
numbers*
18 15 (34.7**)
15
23
21
21 5.5 8.5 5 29
26.1
73
66
23
21.7
16
14
19 100
in this***:
– Army
– Air Force
– Navy
9.1
3.4
3.5
8.7 (27.3**)
3.1 (4.4**)
2.3 (3**)
7.5
2.1
3.7
7.3
3.6
3.4
4.95
0.25
0.3
6.5
1
0.5
4
0.25
0.5
15
6.5
3.4
45.8
9.7
7.1
6.2
4.6
–
7
4
–
11
5
–
60
25.4
10.1
% of popula-
tion
0.32 0.28 (0.64**) 0.46 0.22 0.42 0.27 0.22 0.39 0.33 0.21 0.26 0.19 0.26
military 
spending 
per 1 active 
service 
person (US$ 
thousands)
251 243.7 344.4 290.1 70.7 41.3 57.8 29 36.1 112.8 76.1 72.5 89.2
* Where significantly different from the number of posts.
** Finland has the capacity to more than double the number rapidly during peacetime.
*** Formations outside the three service branches and home guard maintained by the armed forces  
during peacetime were not included. In the case of Hungary, where the service branches are not  
organisationally separate, the numbers are indicative.
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Table 3. Army – numbers of basic categories of offensive weapons  
according to CFE
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary* Poland
tanks
1st generation  
(1980s)
[70] 42
2nd generation 
(1980s)
80+[270] 249 [134] 30+[39] 15+[146] 341+[243]
2nd generation 
(1990s)
54
3rd generation 
(1980s)
91 52 [160] 126
3rd generation 
(1990s)
30 232
3rd generation 
(21st century)
20+[37] 120
total
– of this in service
57
20
161
91
52
52
280
120
350
80
345
345
164
30
69
30
161
15
942
699
infantry fighting vehicles
1st generation  
(1970s)
20+[80] 23 250 143+[236] [502] 1377
1st generation  
(1980s)
110 114 174 207 91
2nd generation 
(21st century)
45 102 103+(43) 385
total
– of this in service
45
45
212
212
103+(43)
103
385
385
214
134
197
197
457
457
470
234
[502]
–
1377
1377
Table 3. Army – numbers of basic categories of offensive weapons  
according to CFE
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary* Poland
tanks
1st generation  
(1980s)
[70] 42
2nd generation 
(1980s)
80+[270] 249 [134] 30+[39] 15+[146] 341+[243]
2nd generation 
(1990s)
54
3rd generation 
(1980s)
91 52 [160] 126
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(1990s)
30 232
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(21st century)
20+[37] 120
total
– of this in service
57
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161
91
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120
350
80
345
345
164
30
69
30
161
15
942
699
infantry fighting vehicles
1st generation  
(1970s)
20+[80] 23 250 143+[236] [502] 1377
1st generation  
(1980s)
110 114 174 207 91
2nd generation 
(21st century)
45 102 103+(43) 385
total
– of this in service
45
45
212
212
103+(43)
103
385
385
214
134
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197
457
457
470
234
[502]
–
1377
1377
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Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary* Poland
armoured personnel carriers
older types  
(before 1990)
416 940 288 425 139 210 300+[890] 930 57 56+[149] 591
new types  
(after 1990)
90 62 113** 31** 40+(67) 487+(408)
total
– of this in service
506
506
1002
1002
288
288
538
538
139
139
210
210
1190
300
961
961
97+(67)
97
205
56
591
591
487+(408)
487
artillery, cal. 100 mm or higher (guns/howitzers and similar, mortars, multiple missile launchers)
self–propelled gun 
howitzers
– older types 12 [90] 14 206 [46] 48+[116] [153] 643
– new types (24)*** (24)*** 16 4+(20)**
towed gun howitzers
– older types 618 220 66 54 150 434 [74] 12 [287]
– new types 54
mortars
– older types 20 927 50 179 109 several 356 317 93 37 170
– new types 24+(18)
multiple missile 
launchers
– older types 58 12 92+[200] 134 [60] 26 [62] 249
– new types 54 54+(21)
total 32 1771+(18) 26+(24) 270+(24) 245 163 several 1004 985 317 153 514 1120+(41)
– of this in service 32 1681 26 270 245 163 804 939 141 79 12 1120
* The Hungarian Army lists 43 of the 146 tanks in store and 287 of the gun howitzers in store,  
the remaining items in store have been deleted from the list of arms.
** With an option to purchase more arms of this type: armoured personnel carriers (Sweden 113, 
Romania 60) and gun howitzers (Poland 48).
*** Deliveries started in 2011. 
{in working order/in operational use}  [withdrawn/in reserve]  (ordered)
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary* Poland
armoured personnel carriers
older types  
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416 940 288 425 139 210 300+[890] 930 57 56+[149] 591
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90 62 113** 31** 40+(67) 487+(408)
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97+(67)
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487+(408)
487
artillery, cal. 100 mm or higher (guns/howitzers and similar, mortars, multiple missile launchers)
self–propelled gun 
howitzers
– older types 12 [90] 14 206 [46] 48+[116] [153] 643
– new types (24)*** (24)*** 16 4+(20)**
towed gun howitzers
– older types 618 220 66 54 150 434 [74] 12 [287]
– new types 54
mortars
– older types 20 927 50 179 109 several 356 317 93 37 170
– new types 24+(18)
multiple missile 
launchers
– older types 58 12 92+[200] 134 [60] 26 [62] 249
– new types 54 54+(21)
total 32 1771+(18) 26+(24) 270+(24) 245 163 several 1004 985 317 153 514 1120+(41)
– of this in service 32 1681 26 270 245 163 804 939 141 79 12 1120
* The Hungarian Army lists 43 of the 146 tanks in store and 287 of the gun howitzers in store,  
the remaining items in store have been deleted from the list of arms.
** With an option to purchase more arms of this type: armoured personnel carriers (Sweden 113, 
Romania 60) and gun howitzers (Poland 48).
*** Deliveries started in 2011. 
{in working order/in operational use}  [withdrawn/in reserve]  (ordered)
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Table 4. Air force – numbers of combat aircraft and combat helicopters  
according to CFE
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary Poland
combat aircraft
3rd generation 
(1980s)
43 {7} 48 48
4th generation  
(1980s)
30+[32] 57 15 {5} [12] 21 {4} [12] 31
4th generation  
(1990s – 21st century)
62 134 {120} 14 14 48
total 62 62 57 134 58 60 14 21 26 127
upgrade plans
purchase plans:
– 4th generation
– 5th generation
30
*
62
52
100
10
60–80
*
16 24
24
16
combat helicopters
 1980s 6 {3} 14 12 29
1990s 10
total 6 24 12 29
combat support helicopters
1980s 18 10 18 {4} 35 12 10 15 32
1990s 11 23 16
21st century 14 12+(8) 8+(7)
total 14 12+(8) 18 18+(7) 29 58 28 10 15 32
* No decision as yet or no publicly disclosed information on the number of machines or upgrade/pur-
chase plans.
{in working order/in operational use}   [withdrawn/in reserve]  (ordered)
Table 4. Air force – numbers of combat aircraft and combat helicopters  
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{in working order/in operational use}   [withdrawn/in reserve]  (ordered)
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Table 5. Navy – numbers of basic warships according  
to the Vienna Document 
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary Poland
missile frigates
1970s 4 2
1980s 3
21st century 3+2* 5
corvettes
1980s 4 3 5 3
1990s 2
21st century 5
missile boats
1970s 3
1980s 3
1990s 4 3
21st century 2+(1) 4 4 +(2)
submarines
1960s 4
1980s 2 [1] 1
1990s 6 3
total
7+(1) 8 15+(2) 14 10 14 13
* Two Absalon–class multirole vessels with missile frigate characteristics are classified as command and 
support vessels.  
(number of vessels under construction) [number of vessels in reserve]
Table 5. Navy – numbers of basic warships according  
to the Vienna Document 
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary Poland
missile frigates
1970s 4 2
1980s 3
21st century 3+2* 5
corvettes
1980s 4 3 5 3
1990s 2
21st century 5
missile boats
1970s 3
1980s 3
1990s 4 3
21st century 2+(1) 4 4 +(2)
submarines
1960s 4
1980s 2 [1] 1
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total
7+(1) 8 15+(2) 14 10 14 13
* Two Absalon–class multirole vessels with missile frigate characteristics are classified as command and 
support vessels.  
(number of vessels under construction) [number of vessels in reserve]
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Table 6. Basic and prospective types of armament that may be used  
for military–technological co–operation*
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary Poland
tanks
Leopard 2A5/2A6** 57 120
Leopard 2A4 91 52 [160] 126
T–72M 80+[270] [134] 30+[39] 15+[43] 341+[243]
infantry fighting vehicles
CV90 45 102 103+(43) 385
BMP–2 110 207 91
BMP–1 23+[80] 122 250 143+[236] [502] 1377
armoured personnel carriers
AMV/Rosomak 62 113** 487+(408)
Piranha III 90 31***
artillery, cal. 100 mm or higher
Archer 24 24
Dana/Zuzana**** 48+[116] 16 111
surface–to–air missile launchers
9K33 Osa 24 16 60
2K12 Kub 20 40 4 4 12+[32] 30
NASAMS 2 (24) 24
combat aircraft
JAS 39 Gripen 134 14 14
F–16 
– version C/D 48
– version A/B 62 57
MiG–29 15 [12] 21 [12] 31
Table 6. Basic and prospective types of armament that may be used  
for military–technological co–operation*
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary Poland
tanks
Leopard 2A5/2A6** 57 120
Leopard 2A4 91 52 [160] 126
T–72M 80+[270] [134] 30+[39] 15+[43] 341+[243]
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CV90 45 102 103+(43) 385
BMP–2 110 207 91
BMP–1 23+[80] 122 250 143+[236] [502] 1377
armoured personnel carriers
AMV/Rosomak 62 113** 487+(408)
Piranha III 90 31***
artillery, cal. 100 mm or higher
Archer 24 24
Dana/Zuzana**** 48+[116] 16 111
surface–to–air missile launchers
9K33 Osa 24 16 60
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F–16 
– version C/D 48
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Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary Poland
transport aircraft
C–130J Super Hercules 4 3+(2)
C–130 Hercules
– version E/H 8 1 5
– version B 4
C–27J Spartan 3 3 5+(2)
C–295 2+(1) 4 11
combat helicopters
Mi–24/Mi–35 6 24 12 29
transport and combat support helicopters
Mi–8/Mi–17 18 28 10 15 32
UH–60 Black Hawk 8+(7)
NH90 12+(8) (14) 4+(14)
tactical unmanned aerial vehicles
RQ–7 Shadow 8 11
anti–ship missiles
RBS–15 yes yes yes
NSM yes (yes)
* The table does not include basic and prospective arms and weapons held by the armed forces of single 
states. These are unlikely to be purchased by other states covered by this report, and therefore unlikely  
to become subjects of co–operation (such as the F/A–18 Hornet combat aircraft of the Finnish Armed 
Forces, the AW101 transport helicopters of the Danish Armed Forces or the TR–85 tanks of the Romanian 
Armed Forces).
** Danish and Swedish tanks represent a standard between 2A5 and 2A6 (the Danish tanks are in fact 
model 2A6 with the previous version of the gun).
*** With an option to buy more carriers (Sweden 113, Romania 60).
**** The armed forces of the Czech Republic and Poland possess Dana cal. 152 mm gun howitzers (Warsaw 
Pact standard), while the Slovak Armed Forces have Zuzana cal. 155 mm gun howitzers (NATO standard), 
which are an upgraded version of the former type (after the break–up of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia inheri-
ted the plant manufacturing gun howitzers, among other assets).
[withdrawn / in reserve]     (ordered)
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Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary Poland
transport aircraft
C–130J Super Hercules 4 3+(2)
C–130 Hercules
– version E/H 8 1 5
– version B 4
C–27J Spartan 3 3 5+(2)
C–295 2+(1) 4 11
combat helicopters
Mi–24/Mi–35 6 24 12 29
transport and combat support helicopters
Mi–8/Mi–17 18 28 10 15 32
UH–60 Black Hawk 8+(7)
NH90 12+(8) (14) 4+(14)
tactical unmanned aerial vehicles
RQ–7 Shadow 8 11
anti–ship missiles
RBS–15 yes yes yes
NSM yes (yes)
* The table does not include basic and prospective arms and weapons held by the armed forces of single 
states. These are unlikely to be purchased by other states covered by this report, and therefore unlikely  
to become subjects of co–operation (such as the F/A–18 Hornet combat aircraft of the Finnish Armed 
Forces, the AW101 transport helicopters of the Danish Armed Forces or the TR–85 tanks of the Romanian 
Armed Forces).
** Danish and Swedish tanks represent a standard between 2A5 and 2A6 (the Danish tanks are in fact 
model 2A6 with the previous version of the gun).
*** With an option to buy more carriers (Sweden 113, Romania 60).
**** The armed forces of the Czech Republic and Poland possess Dana cal. 152 mm gun howitzers (Warsaw 
Pact standard), while the Slovak Armed Forces have Zuzana cal. 155 mm gun howitzers (NATO standard), 
which are an upgraded version of the former type (after the break–up of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia inheri-
ted the plant manufacturing gun howitzers, among other assets).
[withdrawn / in reserve]     (ordered)
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Table 7. Engagement in NATO/EU/US operations
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary Poland
land operations (number of troops deployed as at end of 2011 / first half of 2012)
Afghanistan (ISAF) 750 156 406 500 163 237 139 602 1938 519 308 383 2560
Kosovo (KFOR) 35 20 3 67 1 – – 10 59 7 – 261 229
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Althea)
– 4 – – 2 1 – 119 56 – 32 160 188
air operations (number of combat aircraft engaged)
Baltic Air Policing
3x4 (2004, 
2009, 
2011)
2x4 (2005, 
2007)
4 (2007) 4 (2009)
4x4 
(2006, 
2008, 
2010, 
2012)
Libya (Odyssey 
Dawn)
6 (2011) 6 (2011)
Libya (Unified Pro-
tector)
6 (2011) 6 (2011) 5* (2011)
naval operations (number of ships engaged)
Horn of Africa  
(Enduring Freedom)
1 
 (since 
2008)
Somalia (Atalanta) 1 (2011) 1 (2009)
4 (2009–
2010)
Libya (Unified 
Protector) 1 (2011) 1 (2011)
* Before June 2011, eight Swedish combat aircraft were participating in the operation.
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Table 8. Involvement in multinational formations and operations – partners
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia
Lithu-
ania
Latvia Bulgaria Romania
Czech 
Republic
Slovakia Hungary Poland
European Union Battle Groups
partners Nordic*
Sweden 
Estonia
Ireland 
Norway
“107”**
Germany
Nether-
lands
Austria
Lithuania
Nordic*
Sweden
Finland 
Estonia
Ireland 
Nordic*
Finland 
Estonia
Ireland
Norway
 
II–2013
UK
Nordic*
Sweden
Finland 
Ireland
Norway
I–2010
Poland
Germany
Latvia 
Slovakia
„107”**
Germany
Nether-
lands
Finland 
Austria
I–2010
Poland
Germany
Lithu-
ania 
Slovakia
HEL–
BROC***
Greece 
Cyprus
Romania 
HEL–
BROC***
Greece 
Cyprus
Bulgaria
 
II–2010
Italy
Turkey
II–2009
Slovakia
II–2012
Germany
Austria
Croatia
Macedo-
nia
I–2010
Poland
Germany
Lithu-
ania
Latvia
II–2009
Czech 
Republic
II–2012
Italy
Slovenia
I–2010
Germany 
Lithu-
ania
Latvia
Slovakia
operation in Afghanistan (ISAF)
partners Estonia Sweden Latvia Finland Denmark Norway
lead states France
UK
France
Germany
France
Germany
France
Germany
France
UK
France France
Germany
France
Italy
France
USA
France France 
Canada
France France
USA
operation in Kosovo (KFOR)
partners Estonia Denmark
lead states France France USA USA
Italy
Italy USA
* I–2008, I–2011, I–2015
** I–2007 (without Austria and Lithuania), I–2011 
*** II–2007, II–2011
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BROC***
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II–2010
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Turkey
II–2009
Slovakia
II–2012
Germany
Austria
Croatia
Macedo-
nia
I–2010
Poland
Germany
Lithu-
ania
Latvia
II–2009
Czech 
Republic
II–2012
Italy
Slovenia
I–2010
Germany 
Lithu-
ania
Latvia
Slovakia
operation in Afghanistan (ISAF)
partners Estonia Sweden Latvia Finland Denmark Norway
lead states France
UK
France
Germany
France
Germany
France
Germany
France
UK
France France
Germany
France
Italy
France
USA
France France 
Canada
France France
USA
operation in Kosovo (KFOR)
partners Estonia Denmark
lead states France France USA USA
Italy
Italy USA
* I–2008, I–2011, I–2015
** I–2007 (without Austria and Lithuania), I–2011 
*** II–2007, II–2011
The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing 
the EU’s security policy, NATO’s transformation, the reorientation 
of US security policy and the problems experienced by European defence 
industries – all together have in recent years created an increased interest 
in political, military and military-technological co-operation in Europe. 
It has manifested itself in concepts of closer co-operation within NATO 
and the EU (smart defence and pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives outside the structures of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic 
Defence Co-operation or the Franco-British co-operation) and debates 
about the prerequisites, principles and objectives of bilateral, multilateral 
and regional security and defence co-operation. 
The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence 
co-operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea 
and the Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden), the Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland’s partners 
in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as 
Romania and Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those 
states are Poland’s natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. 
It may complement the ‘Western’ direction of Poland’s security and defence 
policy, i.e. relations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. 
Its goal is not to replace the existing security structures but rather to 
strengthen military capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU. 
